DE ARAGON – The Chronicle of a Confederate Surgeon – Part 6

by Robert M. Webb on May 11, 2012 · 2 comments

This is the 6th part in the series about Major Ramon T. de Aragon, a surgeon in the Army of Tennesee. This post covers the Battle of Murfreesborough after Bragg brought his army back out of Kentucky following the Battle of Perryville.

     The journey back to Knoxville was about two hundred miles through country that offered virtually no sustenance for Bragg’s stalwart troops. Many of the men were barefoot and their clothes hung in rags. Winter weather had come to the Tennessee highlands and typhoid, scurvy, dysentery, and pneumonia became the enemy along with the bitter cold. Captain De Aragon and his fellow medical officers were now the front line troops. Fifteen thousand men were placed in hospitals along the railroad as far south as Marietta, Georgia. For the remaining twenty-seven thousand small relief was available. There were plenty of supplies warehoused in and around Knoxville, but they were reserved for Robert E. Lee’s “Army of Northern Virginia”. The Confederate Government felt the situation in Virginia took precedence over that in Tennessee.

     The army’s morale was at a new low. The men were disgusted with Bragg and were clamoring for Generals Joseph E. Johnston or Beauregard to lead them. Messages condemning his actions were being received in Richmond from all of his ranking commanders and on October 23, 1862, Jefferson Davis summoned him to the capitol for a conference.

     Davis did not want to make a command change. Bragg’s Kentucky campaign had not been a complete loss. The Army of Kentucky had inflicted more than twenty-five thousand casualties on the enemy and had captured over thirty cannon along with a large quantity of supplies – albeit at the cost of half his men. Also, a force under the command of Confederate Major General Van Dorn had been defeated trying to retake Corinth, Mississippi and Bragg’s was now the only force able to resist an invasion into the Deep South.

     A somewhat humble Bragg told Davis that he planned to take his army to the town of Murfreesborough, Tennessee and from there drive the Yankees from Nashville. Davis decided to keep Bragg, but to alleviate the situation he gave Joe Johnston, fourth ranking general in the Confederate army, command over a military district that stretched from the Appalachians to the Mississippi River. This new department encompassed those of Bragg, Kirby Smith, and Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, who was in Mississippi. President Davis then called Leonidas Polk and Kirby Smith to Richmond and to pacify them promoted each of them, along with William Hardee, to Lieutenant General.

     On October 16, Federal commander Buell wired Washington that he could not pursue Bragg because the roads were too rough and the country too barren. He broke off the pursuit and ordered his army back to Nashville to resupply. Lincoln’s answer was to relieve Buell on October 23 and replaced him with Major General William S. Rosecrans, “Old Rosy” to his troops. Rosecrans followed his new command to Nashville and renamed it the ”Army of the Cumberland.” They were all in Nashville by November 17.

     Nashville had grown to be the largest city in the state. In 1862 it had a population of twenty-five thousand of which five thousand were black. Of the black population a number were free and were themselves slave holders. There was a certain element of corruption there as with all large communities, and the number of prostitutes and criminals increased dramatically with the coming of the Federal Army. The Yankee soldiers outnumbered the civilians two to one. During the occupation the Nashville Dispatch published a column entitled “Robberies and Outrages Perpetrated By Soldiers.” The city was full of Southern sympathizers and Rosecrans organized a “Secret Service” and a police force to either imprison or eject anyone he felt was a threat to the Union. Lincoln and Henry Halleck, who was now General-in-Chief of all the Federal armies, pressured Rosecrans to immediately attack Bragg but he refused to budge until he was ready.

     Bragg sent Major General Breckinridge ahead to Murfreesborough with a force of some six thousand to secure the town. Breckinridge arrived there on October 28 and ordered increased cavalry raids toward Nashville to mask the small size of his force. Around November 1 Bragg’s army left Knoxville going first to Chattanooga and then to Tullahoma, where the men were finally provided adequate food and new clothes. On November 20 they began arriving in Murfreesborough. Bragg renamed his army the “Army of Tennessee”.

     The military importance of this town of four thousand ( the modern spelling is Murfreesboro) was the railroad that passed through it on the way to Chattanooga. For Bragg it was his only supply line and to the Federals it was the only one they would have if they launched an invasion south.

      In late 1862 the economy of the South was beginning to suffer from the Union blockade and the occupation of Middle and West Tennessee. A lack of medicine was a particular problem – what there was available was brought in by blockade runners or smuggled in from the North. The Confederate Medical Corps began to compensate by gathering herbs and utilizing folk remedies, which in many cases worked just as well as some of the normal procedures in use at the time.

     The news from home in Fayette County was discouraging. In the journal of Lieutenant H. C. Moorman of Company “G”, 13th Tennessee Infantry, he wrote on December 5, 1862:

… had very bad news from home – all the negroes gone to the Yankees who are devastating the whole country – Grant’s headquarters are at LaGrange – his orders are arbitrary and tyranical …”

   On December 13, the day of the Battle of Fredricksburg, Virginia, Jefferson Davis paid a visit to Murfreesborough and held a review of Hardee’s and Polk’s Corps. Davis had a need to reinforce Pemberton in Mississippi. He decided that Bragg was not seriously threatened by the Yankees at Nashville as Rosecrans seemed to have only defensive purposes. Against everyone’s advice he detached Major General Carter Stevenson’s Division and sent it to Pemberton. This took three brigades totaling seventy-five hundred men away from Bragg’s army.

     Davis was serenaded that evening by regimental bands and made a brief address as did Generals Breckinridge, Bragg, and Polk. The following day there was an affair which was the epitome of the chivalry and gentility of the South. The marriage of cavalry leader Brigadier General John Hunt Morgan to Miss Mattie Ready was attended by all the Southern knights and their ladies. The ceremony was performed by Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk (in his capacity as an Anglican Bishop) and Generals Cheatham, Hardee, and Breckinridge stood up with the groom as the marriage vows were exchanged. A week later Morgan took his cavalry on a raid into Kentucky north of Bowling Green. There he did substantial damage to the railroad and to Federal supplies. This action did, however, take him away from Murfreesborough during the upcoming conflict.

     The men of the Army of Tennessee were faring much better because they were in friendly territory and were well supplied. Many of the Tennessee troops had families close by and went on Christmas furlough. There was a grand ball on the town square on Christmas Eve – music courtesy of the 1st Louisiana and the 6th Kentucky Regimental Bands. Unfortunately, Bragg chose this time to condemn three men to death, thus once again creating a morale problem.

     The Cumberland River had been low but began to rise as late December brought increased rainfall. Rosecrans decided that it was now time to go after Bragg and three Federal corps numbering more than forty thousand men left Nashville on December 23. The left wing commanded by Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, younger brother of Confederate General George B. Crittenden, moved down the Murfreesborough Pike directly toward the town. The right wing under Major General Alexander McDowell McCook went down the Nolensville Pike and then east. The third Federal column under Major General George H. Thomas moved down the Franklin Pike and then east through Nolensville and across McCook’s rear to the center.

     After the departure of Stevenson’s Division, Bragg’s army numbered approximately thirty thousand and was spread out for miles. While Polk’s Corps was camped around Murfreesborough, Bragg had placed Hardee at Eagleville and McCown’s Division at Readyville effectively guarding all the approaches that could be used by the Federals. Reports began to trickle in about the advance of enemy troops and although he was unsure of Rosecrans’ intent, Bragg began to concentrate his forces.

     Murfreesborough was a bad choice for a place to have a battle. The Federals’ supply line back to Nashville was only thirty miles while Bragg’s stretched over one hundred miles back to Chattanooga. The terrain featured fields of cotton and corn separated by thick growths of trees, mostly Tennessee Red Cedar. Hardee wrote that it “… offered no peculiar advantages for defense.” To effectively block the Nashville Pike, Bragg had to divide his army by placing troops on both sides of the west fork of Stone’s River.

     On December 26, Brigadier General George Maney’s Brigade of Cheatham’s Division was on outpost duty, along with a brigade of Joe Wheeler’s cavalry, in front of Stewart’s Creek at LaVergne, some five miles toward Nashville on the Nashville Pike. The enemy was camped three miles beyond LaVergne. The Yankees made a general forward movement and the outpost was ordered to retire slowly to the line of battle Bragg had chosen. The next day , December 27, the men of Polk’s Corps were ordered to cook three day’s rations and on December 28 they struck their tents and retired their baggage trains to the rear.

     Bragg’s troops were not deployed in an even line but followed the contours of the irregular terrain. He stationed Breckinridge’s Division on some high ground east of Stone’s River. Major General Jones M. Wither’s Division extended west from the river near the point where the railroad crossed the Nashville Pike. Major General J. P. McCown’s Division was on Wither’s left with Major General Patrick Cleburne’s Division in support. Major General Frank Cheatham’s Division was placed in line behind Wither’s on the morning of December 29. Cheatham’s left was anchored on the Franklin Pike with his line extending to the Northeast. The division alignment, from left to right was Brigadier General Preston Smith’s Brigade – commanded in his absence by Colonel Alfred J. Vaughan of the 13th Tennessee Infantry, Brigadier General George Maney’s Brigade, A. P. Stewart’s Brigade, and Brigadier General Daniel S. Donelson’s Brigade.

     The enemy advanced slowly on December 30, using heavy artillery shelling to develop the Confederate line. They came within three hundred yards of the brigade of Colonel J. Q. Loomis on Wither’s left. At 3:00 p. m. there was heavy skirmishing and shelling on the Confederate left but it all died down as the sun went down and the armies of both sides settled in for the night.

     A cold rain was falling as the men spent a miserable night without shelter. The regimental bands of both armies began playing and struck up a duel of sorts, each side trying to outdo the other playing the favorite patriotic songs of their troops. Finally one Union band began playing “Home Sweet Home” and was immediately joined by a Southern band across the way. Soon all the bands along the lines of the opposing armies were united in a song that must have certainly stirred the heart of the most hard bitten veteran. As the last melancholy notes drifted away silence settled over the field, leaving the men to contemplate their fate in the battle that was sure to come.

     Both Bragg and Rosecrans had unknowingly settled on the same basic plan of attack. Each had decided to assault his enemy’s right flank with a surprise attack at dawn on the morning of December 31.  Rosecrans even had campfires built out past the end of his line on his right to deceive the Rebels into thinking he was moving troops in that direction.

     At 2 a. m. Federal Brigadier General Joshua Sill of Sheridan’s Division looked out from where his brigade was posted in the Union center. In the light of the Confederate’s campfires he could make out the shapes of men moving to the west. He informed Sheridan of this and together they rode to the place where McCook was camped and woke him to report that they had seen Rebel troop movement. McCook replied that he and Rosecrans were both aware of this and that all was going according to plan. Sheridan was concerned nonetheless and he personally visited all twelve of his regiments, ordering the men up and formed in line of battle.

     Shortly after 6 a. m. ghostly shapes began to appear in front of the cedars to the South and Southwest of McCook’s line. Silently they came forward through the foggy gray mist of the false dawn. Union Brigadier General Edward N. Kirk watched them coming and wrote “They moved in heavy masses apparently six lines deep. Their left extended far beyond our right, so as to completely outflank us.”

     There was no sound until they were nearly on top of the Yankee line, and then the air was filled with the unearthly, undulating “Rebel Yell” as over ten thousand screaming Southern men exploded into the enemy line. The seven brigades of Major Generals McCown and Cleburne had taken the Federal right flank completely by surprise. Although McCook had a greater number of men, most were either asleep or otherwise unprepared to fight.

     McCown’s was the advance division and two of his brigades, those of Brigadier Generals Matthew D. Ector and Evander McNair, charged through the camps of Kirk’s Brigade. Kirk himself was mortally wounded and within minutes his men were driven into the brigade of Brigadier General August Willich. All three of the brigades of Brigadier General R. W. Johnson’s Division were driven back in confusion.

     Confederate Brigadier General James E. Rains fell mortally wounded as his brigade swept around the Federal flank. Brigadier General John A. Wharton and his brigade of Rebel cavalry galloped around the infantry to sweep the enemy’s rear nearly capturing McCook’s supply train. Cleburne’s Division advanced to the right and rear of McCown and like a tidal wave came down on the troops of Brigadier General Jefferson C. Davis, wheeling to the right as they attacked.

     In the Confederate center, Colonel J. Q. Loomis’ Brigade was late in moving forward to the attack. At 7:00 a. m. his Alabamians attacked head on into the men of Colonel William E. Woodruff’s Brigade of Davis’ Division. Loomis was disabled by a falling tree limb and command of his brigade was taken over by Colonel J. G. Coltart. Here the Federal resistance was the firmest. Woodruff’s men fell back briefly but rallied and drove Coltart’s troops back. Colonel A. M. Manigault, on Coltart’s right, had also been repulsed and Cheatham had to commit both his supporting brigades during the first hour of fighting.

     At sunrise Vaughan received word that the front line needed support and moved his brigade forward. The 9th Texas Infantry was posted one hundred yards in the rear of the rest of the brigade as there had not been room for them between the end of the line and the Franklin Pike. As the balance of the brigade advanced obliquely across the field to the right, Vaughan’s assistant adjutant-general, Captain M. W. Clusky, moved the regiment and rested it on the right of Brigadier General S. A. M. Wood’s Brigade which was across the road to the left of Vaughan’s line.


     As Vaughan’s Tennesseans passed Coltart’s men who were falling back, they jeered them for retreating so soon. One Alabama man was heard to reply “You’ll soon find it the hottest place you’ve ever struck!” Vaughan’s main line charged over the same ground as Loomis’s men had earlier. They briefly penetrated Woodruff’s line and drove them from two of their guns. Heavy fire on their left caused heavy casualties and Vaughan, not having any reserve had to fall back.

     Clusky also had Captain De Aragon’s regiment move forward and at the top of the next hill they encountered the enemy two hundred yards to their left oblique. Colonel Young ordered the regiment to fire two volleys and then moved them by the right flank to a position near the 29th Tennessee Infantry. There they took position behind a fence and fired on the enemy which was now only one hundred yards away. The regiments of Wood’s Brigade moved up on Young’s left and also opened fire.

     Young ordered his men to cross the fence and charge the enemy. The men misunderstood his intent and advanced only fifty yards where they stopped and fired. They immediately came under a murderous crossfire and within five minutes Captain De Aragon and his infirmary corps were faced with over one hundred men down.

     Vaughan had by this time given word for the brigade to retire, but Young had not received the order. To get his men out of their predicament Young knew they had to either advance or retreat. He elected to have what was left of his men attack the enemy in their front. First he passed down the line and notified each company commander. He then took hold of the colors and holding them aloft led the way as he ordered the charge – and charge they did, “a la Texas”(colors in hand) as Young described it in his report on the battle. The Yankees fled back through some woods and on through to the large open fields that lay between the Franklin and Wilkinson Pikes. Advancing through the fields the regiment captured an enemy hospital.

     Young had the regiment advance with Wood’s Brigade, thinking that the rest of the brigade was moving up on the right. They fired on another enemy line which also retreated to a wood one-fourth of a mile past the hospital. Here the Yankees opened on them with several batteries of artillery and the regiment fell back a short distance. Young then formed the men on the left of Maney’s Brigade until the rest of Vaughan’s Brigade found them. Vaughan formed his regiments on Maney’s left and placed the 9th Texas Infantry on the right of the line. There he rested his men while the artillery fire of the enemy continued.

     Cheatham launched another attack with the brigades of Vaughan, Coltart, and Manigault with Maney in support. Vaughan encountered Bushrod Johnson’s Brigade in a line of battle perpendicular to his own. He changed front and attacked the Federals that were in the woods on his right. The enemy fled across the Wilkinson Pike and on to the Nashville Pike. Vaughan again changed front and advanced across the Wilkinson Pike with a view of cutting the enemy off. There he came upon Wood’s Brigade and engaged a Federal force trying to flank Wood on his right. He drove them into the only field left before the Nashville Pike.

     Leonidas Polk was standing with Cheatham during one of the attacks and Cheatham was cheering his men on, yelling “Give em hell! Give em hell!” The former Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana joined in with “Give em what General Cheatham says, boys! Give em what General Cheatham says!”

     Woodruff’s line had been flanked on both sides. A combined attack by Maney and Manigault, although poorly coordinated, succeeded in driving the residue of Sheridan’s Division across the Wilkinson Pike, completing the rout of McCook’s Corps. Joshua Sill, the man who had witnessed the Rebels redeploying their troops during the night, was killed by a bullet to the head while leading a counterattack against Manigault’s troops. Sheridan withdrew his line to the cedars just north of the Wilkinson Pike and tried to form a new line there. Vaughan’s Brigade, advancing alongside of Cleburne’s troops, drove the enemy to the Nashville Pike.

     McCook’s troops had been driven from their line of battle by 10:00 a. m. By 12:00 noon the entire corps had been pushed back three miles to the Nashville Pike and the Confederate line was now at a right angle from its original position. The Federals made a stand at a last line of defense between the railroad and the pike.

     Rosecrans had his headquarters on the Nashville Pike and when he first heard the sounds of fighting on his right flank he thought that McCook was creating a diversion there as planned. As he rode toward the battle he met the demoralized men of his routed divisions fleeing in panic. Finally realizing what had happened he ordered reinforcements to his right.

     With their reserves already committed the Rebel’s attack ran down without their gaining either the railroad or the pike. They stopped their advance and reorganized for a final assault against the point where the v-shaped Federal lines came together. Located there was a four acre forest locally known as the “Round Forest.” After the battle it would known as “Hell’s Half Acre.” Holding this position were all the men of Federal Brigadier General John M. Palmer’s Division along with Brigadier General Milo S. Hascall’s and Colonel George D. Wagner’s Brigade’s of Brigadier General Thomas J. Wood’s Division. Behind the infantry Rosecrans concentrated over fifty pieces of artillery.

     Twice the Confederates attacked the wood in the late morning. First it was Chalmers’ Brigade and then Donelson’s. They broke through two lines of Federal infantry but were driven back in a counterattack. Bragg ordered Breckinridge to send reinforcements from the right of the Confederate line, but Breckinridge refused, citing reports that the Yankees were crossing Stone’s River in his front. This proved to be incorrect so Breckinridge sent four brigades across the river to Polk. Bragg ordered Polk to attack the Round Forest with all he had but as with a similar attack at Shiloh, the fresh brigades were sent in piecemeal as they came up and were for the most part repulsed.

     The last assault was somewhat successful as they pushed the Yankee infantry back from the forest, but as Hardee and Breckinridge rode along the line they found that their men had given their all and were too spent for another attack. The corps commanders ordered their troops to bivouac for the night. Late in the evening Cheatham placed Vaughan’s Brigade on the Wilkinson Pike toward the Confederate left and aligned the rest of the division in a defensive position in the cedars toward the center of the line.

     Both armies suffered from the bitter cold during the night on New Year’s Eve. Most of the men could not build fires because the light would draw enemy fire. The wounded of both sides numbered about the same. Bragg ordered all churches and public buildings in Murfreesborough converted into hospitals.

     Bragg’s army had driven the Yankees back everywhere but on the Confederate right. He expected them to retreat during the night. Rosecrans did not do so and neither he nor Bragg had any further action planned. New Year’s Day came and went with no activity on the line other than minor skirmishing, so the surgeons had the opportunity to tend the wounded with a respite from large numbers of additional casualties – for one day.

     Preston Smith arrived that evening and again took command of the brigade from Vaughan. The next morning, Friday January 2, he moved the brigade to the right and into position with the rest of the division.

     At 3:00 a. m. Friday morning Federal Colonel Samuel Beatty was ordered by Crittenden to occupy the hill above McFadden’s Ford on Stone’s River. One mile southeast of Beatty’s new position was Wayne’s Hill which had been occupied earlier by Breckinridge’s troops but had been deserted when Breckinridge’s Division had crossed the river on December 31 to reinforce Polk. Now they reoccupied the hill. By sunup Beatty’s Division had been reinforced by the addition of Colonel William Grose’s Brigade of Palmer’s Division.

     Just before noon Bragg ordered Breckinridge to attack with his division and take the high ground in his front. The two men were on bad terms and when Breckinridge argued that the attack would be suicidal, Bragg was unmovable. When told of their task all of Breckinridge’s commanders condemned the orders. Brigadier General R. W. Hanson wanted to kill Bragg and had to be subdued.

     As the Confederates moved into line the Federals observed the increased activity and Rosecrans brought up fifty-seven artillery pieces to a ridge above McFadden’s Ford on the other side of Stone’s River.

     The attack opened at 3:45 p. m. with artillery fire from Polk’s Corps as Breckinridge’s men, four brigades totaling sixteen regiments, advanced toward the two Yankee brigades holding the high ground. They pushed the Federal line off the hill but instead of stopping they chased their enemy down toward the river where they came in range of the massed artillery above them. Grape shot and canister mowed down the Confederates in huge numbers. Hanson was mortally wounded and Breckinridge’s own Kentucky Orphan Brigade was decimated. The Federals counterattacked and drove the Rebels back to Wayne’s Hill. Bragg ordered Hardee across the river to reinforce Breckinridge, but it was too late. The Battle of Murfreesborough was over. Breckinridge had suffered seventeen hundred casualties out of five thousand men engaged.

     Once again wounded men converged on Murfreesborough. They overflowed from the improvised hospitals onto porches and even had to be laid out on sidewalks. The exhausted surgeons and nurses had been working for two days and nights without letup and now were joined by volunteers from all quarters. Mrs. Breckinridge could be seen moving among the broken men giving comfort, particularly seeking out her Kentuckians. Bragg began sending some of the wounded south to hospitals in Chattanooga and North Georgia.

     At 2:00 a. m. on January 3, Bragg received a message from Cheatham and Withers and endorsed by Polk advising a retreat. Bragg refused to consider such a thing until daylight when he received information that the enemy was being reinforced and supplied and had greater numbers than originally thought. At 10:00 a. m. he sent for Polk and Hardee to evaluate the situation and all three agreed that it was time to withdraw. The army retreated at midnight in a pouring rain. Cheatham’s Division brought up the rear.

     Bragg headed for the town of Winchester, Tennessee to set up headquarters. He intended to establish a new line on the Elk River. Hardee moved his corps toward Tullahoma and Polk took his to Shelbyville. Cheatham’s Division camped five miles north of the town. Polk reported to Bragg that the enemy was not moving so Bragg stopped Hardee at Wartrace and then set up his own headquarters at Tullahoma. On January 5 Cheatham’s Division moved one mile beyond Shelbyville and camped in the new line which was now on the Duck River. Their tents had all been lost and the wagons containing their bedding had gone to Winchester.

     Bragg’s casualties of the battle were nine thousand two hundred thirty-nine out of thirty-four thousand seven hundred thirty-two engaged – 27%. Rosecrans’ were nine thousand five hundred thirty-two out of forty-one thousand four hundred – 23%. Smith’s Brigade lost seven hundred seven out of one thousand eight hundred thirteen – 39%. This was the highest brigade loss in the division. In Captain De Aragon’s regiment the losses were eighteen killed, one hundred two wounded, and two missing.

     All but one of the brigade field and staff officers’ and all but two of the regimental field and staff officer’s horses were killed, including those of Colonel Young and his Lieutenant Colonel.

     On January 8, 1863 General Braxton Bragg issued the following message to his men:

“Soldiers of the army of Tennessee! Your gallant deeds have won the admiration of your general, your Government, and your country. For myself, I thank you, and am proud of you; for them, I tender you the gratitude and praise you have so nobly won.

     In a campaign of less than one month, in the face of winter, your achievements have been unparalleled. You have captured more than 10,000 prisoners, taken and preserved 30 pieces of artillery and 7000 small-arms, in addition to many thousands destroyed. You have, besides, captured 800 wagons, loaded chiefly with supplies, which have been destroyed or brought safely to your lines; and in pitched battles you have driven the enemy before you, inflicting a loss at least three to one greater than you have sustained.

     In retiring to a stronger position, without molestation from a superior force, you have left him a barren field in which to bury his hosts of slain, and to rally and recuperate his shattered ranks. Cut off from his Government, both by rail and telegraph, and deprived of supplies by the interruption of his communications, we shall yet teach him a severe lesson for the rashness of penetrating a country so hostile to his cause. Whilst the infantry and artillery defy him in front, our invincible cavalry will assail him in flank and rear, until we goad him to another advance, only to meet another signal defeat.

     Your general deplores, in common with you, the loss of you gallant comrades, who have fallen in our recent conflicts. Let their memories be enshrined in your hearts, as they will ever be tenderly cherished by their countrymen. Let it be yours to avenge their fate, and proudly to emulate their deeds. Remember that your face is to the foe, and that on you rests the defense of all that is dear to freemen. Soldiers, the proudest reflection of your general’s life is to known as the commander of an army so brave and invincible as you have proven. He asks no higher boon than to lead such men to victory. To share their trials, and to stand or fall with them, will be the crown of his ambition.


General, Commanding”


{ 2 comments… read them below or add one }

Jeff. Vaughn September 23, 2012 at 2:41 pm

Thank you for your article enjoyed reading vary much


Robert M. Webb September 23, 2012 at 4:02 pm

My pleasure, glad you enjoy it.


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