DE ARAGON The Chronicle of a Confederate Surgeon – Part 7

by Robert M. Webb on May 16, 2012 · 0 comments

Author’s note:

Part 7 of the series on Major Ramon t. de Aragon. After the Battle of Murfreesborough, Major de Aragon’s brigade was sent to Mississippi as part of the force led by General Joseph E. Johnston to attempt breaking through to Vicksburg.

De Aragon – The Chronicle of a Confederate Surgeon

http://www.amazon.com/dp/B007BK8HFC?tag=5336653536-20

Two months prior to the Battle of Murfreesborough, Union General Ulysses S. Grant set up his headquarters at LaGrange, Tennessee. There he conceived a campaign against the town of Vicksburg, Mississippi which would finally give the Yankees complete control of the Mississippi River and split the Confederacy in half. To that end he began concentrating his forces around the major railroad intersection at Grand Junction, Tennessee three miles east of LaGrange. Federal troops moved south into Mississippi in December, 1862.

The taking of Vicksburg would prove to be no easy task. On December 15, 1862, shortly after the bulk of Grant’s army left the area of LaGrange and Grand Junction, Confederate cavalry, under the command of Earl Van Dorn, attacked Holly Springs, Mississippi and captured a huge quantity of Federal supplies. Then on December Rebels galloped into Grand Junction inflicting fifty casualties on the garrison Grant had left there to guard the railroad. Yankee generals finally attempted several land expeditions against Vicksburg, but the Federals were stymied not only by troops commanded by Confederate General Pemberton but by the swampland in Mississippi and Louisiana. January, 1863 brought a series of naval assaults on the town that were no more successful than the land incursions.

In Middle Tennessee, Braxton Bragg’s army made their winter camp strung out between the towns of Shelbyville and Tullahoma. Skirmishing continued between their outposts and Rosecrans’ troops which moved out of Murfreesborough on occasion, but there was no inclination by either commander for a major confrontation during the winter months.

Sometime between January 8 and 11 the wagons containing the blankets belonging to the men of Cheatham’s Division finally showed up at Shelbyville. On January 13 Captain De Aragon received pay, his last as a Medical Steward, for the period of March 1 to May 19, 1862 – $28.96 (Confederate).

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The Affair at Morton’s Ford Conclusion

by Dan O'Connell on May 15, 2012 · 0 comments

Butler’s Raid

BG Isaac Wistar was ordered to advance to Bottom’s Bridge by 0300 on the 7th. Although he was given command of 6200 troops (4,000 infantry and 2.200 cavalry) he elected to begin his movement cautiously. An advanced “picked company”, under the command of CPT Hill, 1st New York Mounted Rifles, was assigned to subdue the Confederate pickets at New Kent, Baltimore Cross-Roads, and Bottom’s Bridge. The telegraph wires between Meadow Station and Richmond were also to be cut. Wistar held no illusions about the difficulty of the mission. He stated

“…of course the success of the enterprise was based on the sudden and noiseless approach”

to the defense at Bottom’s Bridge.

Unfortunately an intelligence leak about the plan had warned the Confederates of the impending raid. PVT William Boyle, 1st New York Mounted Rifles, had been convicted of the murder of one of his officers and was awaiting execution. President Lincoln, however, suspended all executions in Butler’s department. While waiting for suspension of the boycott Boyle had befriended one of his guards who allowed him to escape. Boyle made his way to Richmond and to secure good will told officials in the capital that “large numbers of cavalry and infantry were being concentrated….to take Richmond.”

When COL S. P. Spear, leading detachments from 5 separate regiments failed to capture the Confederate pickets at the second way point any hope of surprise was lost. Although they reached Bottom’s Bridge according to schedule they found the crossing to be defended beyond their expectations. Wistar described the situation at the bridge as follows;

“The bridge planks had been taken up, the fords both above and below effectually obstructed, extensive earth works and rifle pits, and strong force of troops brought down..”

After gathering his forces Wistar determined to test the defenses at the bridge. On the morning of the 7th Major Whelan “made a gallant but unsuccessful charge” down the causeway leading to the bridge. Whelan’s attackers were stopped by canister fired from the south side of the river. The episode claimed 9 casualties and 10 horses.

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The War In Three Acts

by Ned B. on May 14, 2012 · 4 comments

On the bookshelf across from where I am sitting are two trilogies that both try to tell the story of the entire war. One is well known these days – Shelby Foote’s The Civil War: A Narrative, published in the mid-Twentieth Century. The other was well know in its day but is less so now — Benson Lossing’s Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War, first published in the late 1860s. In a chronologically reversed tribute, Lossing has been referred to as “The Shelby Foote of the 19th century”. But that is where the similarity ends. Structurally and stylistically the two works are quite different.

A big difference is the way that the two authors segment the war. Lossing devotes considerable space to the buildup to war during 1860 and early 1861. His first volume opens with the presidential conventions in 1860 and only goes as far as the battle of Bull Run in July 1861. For Foote, the focus is more on the military action and he moves more quickly through the early part of the war. His first volume ends in fall of 1862, over a year later than Lossing. Both then put about a year and a half into their second book such that Foote starts the third book in spring 1864 whereas Lossing is only as far as mid 1863.

I appreciate Lossing’s attention to political developments and the way he highlights characters and actions often marginalized in more modern works. But the result is that too much is crammed into his third volume. I think Foote had the right idea about how to segment the war. To me late 1862 is a pivotal time. There was a shift in US leadership as major leaders of the early war faded. McClellan and Buell were relieved of command, Butler was replaced, Pope and McDowell were sent packing, Curtis sidelined himself, and while Halleck continued as General-in-Chief Lincoln had become aware of his limitations. Late 1862 was also when the mid-term congressional elections occurred and Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, changing the politics of the war. Likewise, I feel that the spring of 1864 is a good break between the middle and final thirds of war. Grant took control of the situation in Virginia and Sherman in Georgia, setting up the campaigns that would bring the war to an end.

How would you segment the war for storytelling purposes?

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The Affair at Morton’s Ford Part 2

by Dan O'Connell on May 13, 2012 · 0 comments

Raccoon Ford

MG Newton’s I Corps troops were assigned to execute the demonstration at Raccoon Ford. The lead elements marched early on February 6th and arrived at the river later that day. A 300 man detail was sent to the ford and to raise attention to their presence burned several buildings. There was no response so three batteries of artillery (Battery B, 4th US: Battery L, 1st New York, and Battery A, 1st Maryland) were brought up. The New York and Maryland batteries were detached to take positions between the Raccoon Ford and Morton’s Ford. They spent the day lobbing 60 rounds of ammunition into the opposite shore. The fire prompted no response from the enemy and all the guns and troops were recalled to camp before the end of the day.

Cavalry Operations at Barrett’s Ford and Culpeper Ford

After travelling on “heavy roads” and through obstructions left behind by retreating Confederate pickets BG Wesley Merritt’s 1st Division troopers reached the Rapidan River early on the morning of the 7th. At Barrett’s Ford they presented themselves as a force attempting to cross the river and elicited “brisk skirmishing with small arms and a lively duel” between artillery batteries until around noon. According to Merritt’s report the supposed attempt to cross was opposed by a “brigade of five regiments of infantry” that moved in to support the skirmishers at the ford. The fight was taken up by the artillerymen, who exchanged shots until 1300 when the demonstration was pulled back. The show of force here cost the Union cavalrymen, 3 Killed and 12 wounded.

BG Judson Kilpatrick, commanding Third Division, sent a force of 1360 troopers and 1 battery of artillery to Culpepers Ford. Detached units were also sent to perform reconnaissance to Germanna and Ely’s Ford. None of Kilpatrick’s men faced any considerable opposition as they reconned as far as Chancellorsville and Jacob’s Ford. Kilpatrick would report that the Confederates had “no considerable force this side of Mine Run.” The scouting parties were called back at 0900 without loss. Intelligence gained from this action included information that Hampton’s cavalry was suffering a lack of mounts and other basic necessities. BG Kilpatrick estimated that only 240 Confederate cavalry picketed the river from Germanna Ford to United States Ford. It was this type of information, although not a primary mission imperative, that would pay great dividends later.

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DE ARAGON – The Chronicle of a Confederate Surgeon – Part 6

by Robert M. Webb May 11, 2012

This is the 6th part in the series about Major Ramon T. de Aragon, a surgeon in the Army of Tennesee. This post covers the Battle of Murfreesborough after Bragg brought his army back out of Kentucky following the Battle of Perryville. The journey back to Knoxville was about two hundred miles through country that [...]

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The Affair at Morton’s Ford Part 1

by Dan O'Connell May 10, 2012

Introduction In the introduction of the opening volume of his fabulous set of works on the Overland Campaign, Gordon Rhea mentions the fight at Morton’s Ford. The brief description of the fight there sparked my curiosity and I thought it would be interesting to look into it further. This short post will describe the action [...]

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The Battle of Belmont Conclusion

by Dan O'Connell May 8, 2012

On the Water Because the Mississippi River separated the opposing forces from the battlefield water transportation was critical. The Union forces needed to move troops across the river under the guns of the Confederate stronghold at Columbus. The threat of these guns forced Grant to make his landings several miles from his objective. The time [...]

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