Why Does Brett Review Older Books?

Review In Brief: Mine Run: A Campaign Of Lost Opportunities

Books on Bristoe Station & Mine Run

Mine Run: A Campaign of Lost Opportunities October 21, 1863-May 1, 1864. Martin F. Graham & George Skoch. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, Inc., June 1987.

130 pp. 6 maps, including 1 large fold-out map.

The post-Gettysburg campaigns of 1863 have always received scant attention in Civil War literature. The twin attractions of Gettysburg as the “turning point” of the war (a view I vehemently disagree with) and “Grant vs. Lee” serve to distract the Civil War buff from the maneuvering and small fights taking place in the fall of 1863 in the East. Meade had detached his XI and XII Corps and sent them west to Chattanooga. Earlier, Lee had sent Longstreet and his I Corps to augment Braxton Bragg’s attack at Chickamauga. This is a period that needs further study, as Brooks Simpson recently pointed out. Although no major fights occurred, the game of cat and mouse between Meade and Lee was no less real or full of consequences. A.P. Hill’s III corps of the ANV received a bloody nose at the hands of Gouverneur Warren and the Union II Corps at Bristoe Station on October 14, 1863, and after several more days of contact, Lee aborted this offensive and retired south behind the Rappahannock, destroying the railroad along the way to discourage a Union offensive.

It is at this point where Graham and Skoch step in and start their book Mine Run: A Campaign of Lost Opportunities. Meade would have been happy to occupy Warrenton and head into winter camp, according to the authors, but Lincoln and his government, frustrated by what the perceived to be Meade’s lack of killer instinct, pressured him to advance. They wouldn’t even allow Meade to shift the advance to the left, using Fredericksburg as a base. Realizing that a failure to move forward might mean the loss of his command, Meade decided to act. Repairing the railroad to Warrenton, Meade moved south to cautiously probe Lee’s forces on the south bank of the Rappahannock. Lee left a bridgehead at Rappahannock Station, thus forcing Meade to worry about a flank attack if he crossed some or all of his army to the south side of the river. The problem lay in the strength of the bridgehead. Lee believed it to be impregnable, but it turned out to be nothing of the sort.

On November 7, 1863, Meade’s troops launched attacks at Kelly’s Ford to the east and Rappahannock Station to the west. Kelly’s Ford was weakly defended because artillery deployed on the north bank would dominate any defenders trying to directly hold the ford. Instead, Lee had his main line farther south, with only a regiment and some artillery holding the ford proper. Naturally enough, the Northern III Corps, led by the 1st and 2nd U.S.S.S. and aided by Union artillery on the high ground, were able to cross the river rather easily. Lee decided to strike this force and wipe it out the next day. As he was making those plans, however, he received word that the Rappahannock Station position had fallen. Late in the day, the Yankees at that point, also backed by artillery, were able to break the Confederate line, capturing over 1600 men of Harry Hays’ Louisiana Brigade and Robert Hoke’s North Carolina Brigade, two of the better brigades in the entire Army of Northern Virginia. Needless to say, this made Lee’s line vulnerable to flanking, and he decided to retreat.

Over a two-day span, Lee made the march south and crossed the Rapidan River, creating a new line. Meade’s army cautiously followed, and many in the Army of the Potomac believed they had wasted an opportunity to catch Lee’s army out in the open in a vulnerable position, their backs to the Rapidan. In any event, Meade was now between the rivers, with Lee to his south and west covering a new river line from Morton’s Ford southwest to Liberty Mills. However, Lee had left unguarded several fords to the east.

Meade formulated a plan calling for his troops to cross the Rapidan to the east using these three fords, then move quickly west along the Orange Turnpike and the Orange Plank Road. Meade believed he could quickly be on Lee’s right flank and rear to the west of Mine Run before the Confederate general had time to react. Plans do not always work out in practice, and numerous delays involving less than enough pontoon boats at two fords, confusion on the march, and dallying generals meant that Lee was able to act in plenty of time. The lines actually settled to the east of Mine Run, not too far west of the future Wilderness battlefield.

There was a sharp action between French’s Union III Corps (Meade’s right flank) and Edward Johnson’s Confederate Division (Lee’s left flank) at Payne’s Farm on November 27, 1863, not too far south of the Rapidan. Johnson not only prevented French from reaching Meade’s center at Robertson’s Tavern farther south. He also stopped Sedgwick’s large VI Corps, trailing behind III Corps on narrow forest roads. Lee, after reviewing the situation, decided to retreat west across Mine Run, and created a formidable line following the north-south flow of that stream. Over the next few days, Meade searched in vain for ways to get at Lee. Finally, on November 30, Warren’s II Corps was to attack Lee’s right. Warren, with the coming light, saw that Lee had vastly strengthened the position and called off the attack. The Union soldiers who had been drawn up in line of battle were delighted, but Meade was embarrassed. He now had no choice but to withdraw and go into winter quarters without a victory. Lee, ever aggressive, had planned a flank attack of his own for December 2, but Meade had already gone. The Mine Run Campaign had ended without a major battle, but neither side knew it would happen that way at the time.

I was very pleasantly surprised with this particular entry in the Virginia Civil War Battles and Leaders Series, published by H.E. Howard. Graham and Skoch laid out an easy, informative read on the campaign, and allowed someone new to the situation such as myself to quickly grasp what was going on. The maps, happily created by George Skoch, go down to regimental level detail in many places. In addition, there is a large fold-out map of the Mine Run area at the back of the book. The only thing I would have liked to have seen was a map covering the area around Rappahannock Station and Kelly’s Ford as a whole. The book was pretty short at only 100 pages of text, but I thought it to be a solid introduction to the campaign. As with most H.E. Howard books, it can in no way be considered “definitive”. The authors relied mainly on unit histories from the looks of the bibliography, though they also looked at around 10 manuscript collections as well. An appendix containing the Orders of Battle was a welcome addition for wargamers such as myself, though there were no unit strengths listed. I would recommend this book to any fan of the war in the east, especially those tired of Gettysburg. More happened in 1863 in the east than your typical short history of the war will tell. As this is the only book on the Mine Run Campaign, and since it was pretty well done for this series of books, I consider this a must-own.

Note: This blog entry originally appeared on June 7, 2006 on the American Civil War Gaming & Reading blog, but was not in the last saved archive. These old posts from June 2006-February 2007 will be gradually added here over time.

Did you enjoy this blog entry?  Subscribe to TOCWOC’s RSS feed today!

Read more Civil War Book Reviews here at TOCWOC!

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Review In Brief: Mine Run: A Campaign of Lost Opportunities

Related posts:

1. Mine Run Campaign Addendum
2. Meade, Mud, Mistakes, and Stalemate: The Mine Run Campaign
3. Trudeau to Take on Bristoe Station and Mine Run?

Of all the stories regarding Everton J. Conger and his successful capture of John Wilkes Booth, one that has always intrigued me is why did Conger decide it was time to fire Richard Garrett’s tobacco barn after hours of making what seemed empty threats to do so?

From Conger’s own testimony all we get is that after David Herold’s surrender, he decided that Booth wasn’t going to come out and hence decided it was time to fire the barn. Conger took this action on his own, without discussing it with his partner, Luther Byron Baker or with Edward P. Doherty, commander of the detachment of the 16th New York Cavalry.

Most historians have accepted Conger’s words at face value, but I think there’s much more to this than Conger was willing to admit, especially later in life. It has to do with the two war wounds that Conger suffered.

The first came on Oct. 23, 1862 on a reconnaissance mission Conger spearheaded when he rode as captain of Company A, 3rd West Virginia Cavalry. Near Bristoe Station, Va., Conger’s group of 40 men came under attack by a larger Confederate force of 125 horse soldiers. Conger’s little group routed their opponents, but not before Conger was shot off his horse with a hip wound. Lying on the ground Conger was struck in the wrist by a rebel soldier’s sword. His men, who were in a hurry to get out of there, decided their commander was dead and left him. But he wasn’t. Conger spent the frigid October night lying on the ground. How he didn’t bleed to death is hard to fathom.

He was discovered to be alive the next day and taken to a local doctor’s home, where he was treated. His whereabouts were discovered by Captain Ulric Dahlgren and eventually Conger was paroled as a POW back to his command. However, he wasn’t ready to return to the field until nearly a year later. With little chance of promotion, Conger asked for and was given the Major’s slot in the First District of Columbia Cavalry.

In 1864, while riding with the 1st D.C., Conger, who by now was Lieutenant Colonel and had de facto command of the regiment, again was wounded on the Wilson-Kautz Raid. As fate would have it, he was again shot in the hips (while his men were dismounted, Conger had to ride his horse because he couldn’t walk very quickly. How it was determined that he was fit for duty is beyond me). This time he was left behind when General James H. Wilson was forced to retreat after the Battle of Ream’s Station, but he later was brought to headquarters where again he was hospitalized. This time, however, he was declared unfit for military service and given a discharge.

The colonel of the 1st D.C. was the notorious Lafayette Baker, who was also the head of what he called the “National Detective Police” which was an arm of the War Department. In what I believe to be an attempt to keep Conger from becoming destitute, Baker gave him a job as a detective. It was in this role that Conger became involved in the manhunt for Booth.

For the remainder of his life, Conger suffered from these wounds immensely. In fact, he once said that he was never able to sleep lying down, instead having to get rest in a seated position in a chair. Why Conger was ever allowed on the manhunt is another question I will have to answer in my biography. Walking was a major ordeal for Conger, who lived his life addicted to both morphine and alcohol in an attempt to mask the pain he constantly felt.

My theory as to why Conger decided it was time to burn the barn is that he simply could not physically take it anymore. He took it on his own initiative to set the barn ablaze because his war wounds were aggravating him to the point of intense physical pain. Conger never mentioned this, however, because he knew it would add to the controversy of him receiving the largest chunk of the reward money issued by the government for Booth’s capture. Indeed, during the trial of John Surratt Conger testified that he was “a little lame” when he went into the field. Saying that Conger was “a little lame” is like saying the war was “a little bloody”. When Luther Byron Baker, who received much less of the reward money than he felt was due him, began to lecture on his role in capturing Booth, he painted Conger as an invalid who had no business being there, and was only there because Conger begged Baker to let him ride, which, simply put, is nonsense. But Conger was sensitive to this attack, so he never mentioned it for the remainder of his life.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Why did Everton Conger burn down Richard Garrett’s tobacco barn?

Related posts:

1. How Everton Conger helped start the American Red Cross
2. Hunt for Lincoln’s Assassin
3. Richard Sommers’ MASSIVE Thesis on the Fifth Offensive at Petersburg is FREE Online

Most serious students of the Civil War may recognize the name of Fr. Jeremiah Trecy, the Catholic priest who Major-General William S. Rosecrans recruited to join the chaplin corps of the Army of the Cumberland. Trecy is more commonly referred to as “Rosecrans’s confessor” and, in truth, he personally did look after the general’s spiritual needs. However, on November 24, 1862, within Fourteenth Army Corps Special Orders, No. 25, Rosecrans officially authorized Father Trecy to administer to those of the Catholic faith in all the various “camps, hospitals and garrisons of this army.” At that time there were a sizable number of Catholic soldiers throughout that army, especially those Irish immigrants in the Regular units, who did not have the opportunity of fulfilling their religious obligations due to the lack of clergy. With orderlies assigned from the Army Headquarters guard, the Tenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Father Trecy at once embarked upon his ministries.

Much of the detailed information about Trecy was preserved by David Power Conyngham, a former staff officer in the Army of the Potomac and contemporary Irish-American advocate author, who began work in the 1870’s upon a manuscript focusing upon conspicuous Northern and Southern Catholic priests and nuns who had ministered in the ranks entitled, Soldiers of the Cross. That manuscript presently resides within the archives of Notre Dame University. Conyngham traveled to Trecy’s parrish, then on the Louisiana coast, and spent some considerable time interviewing the priest about his wartime experiences. Conyngham gathered enough information from Trecy to fill out a good sized chapter in his manuscript.

Trecy’s experiences with Rosecrans and the Fourteenth Army Corps (later designated the Army of the Cumberland) offer additional insights to the General’s character and make for fascinating reading. Trecy recounted one such episode to Conyngham that unintentionally revealed a bit of a hidden practical joke that was played upon the priest by the General, of which the good reverend was apparently still unaware some 15 years later!

This particular episode occurred just before the movement of the army from its Nashville encampments towards Murfreesboro in late December of 1862. Father Trecy, of course, was busily visiting the various camps, performing his ministries and attending to the needs of his military congregations. The life of an army chaplin was still something new to the priest, and Father Trecy did not pretend to understand the military workings of a field army on campaign. As Christmas approached Rosecrans was busily engaged with his own administrations, that of preparing the army for its eminent movement against Bragg’s forces to the south.

Conyngham relates that when Father Trecy eventually returned to headquarters on Christmas Eve, he was shocked to find out that Rosecrans had ordered a general advance for Christmas Day, “the greatest day in the Christian Era!” Trecy is said to have pointed out that fact to Rosecrans, who admitted, “he had not thought of it!” Turning worriedly to Col. Julius Garesche, his Chief-of-Staff, Rosecrans questioned if the order could be safely delayed, to which Garesche responded that such could be easily done. The advance was subsequently ordered for the 26th, a fact of which Trecy seemed both greatly pleased and personally satisfied, even some 15 years later! But, of course, there’s more to the story.

It’s very true that Rosecrans had earlier issued orders for his army to begin the Murfreesboro movement on the morning of December 25th. The execution of those orders, however, were seriously interrupted when the Left Wing commander, Major-General Thomas L. Crittenden, reported that he could not possibly make the intended movement due to a lack of ready forage for his animals, and that he would require virtually all of the 25th in making the necessary foraging expeditions to replenish his stocks. Similar reports had come in from George Thomas’s Center command and by the evening of the 24th Rosecrans had determined to delay the movement to the 26th. Thus for purely logistical reasons the decision had already been made well before Trecy’s visit to headquarters. Rosecrans and Garesche, both of them devout Catholics and socially adept individuals, seemingly could not resist the spur-of-the-moment opportunity that presented itself with Trecy’s horrified reaction to the news of the army’s ill-considered and pagan-like marching orders! With almost flawless aplomb and totally convincing performances they had good-naturedly, yet impishly, played a tongue-in-cheek prank with the good Father!

Light-hearted, jocular moments aside, Father Jeremiah Trecy gave a good account of himself in the subsequent short campaign and battle of Stones River. It is well documented that he was among those of Rosecrans’s staff that rode furiously behind him, under fire, while Rosecrans personally shored up the failing Union lines on Dec. 31st. But Trecy was not with the general the entire time. He left the staff to attend to the suffering of the wounded he saw streaming from McCook’s front. While doing so his orderly’s horse was struck and careened away with both orderly and his own horse. He continued his work until forced to fall back on foot, finding Rosecrans again and being remounted.

Later that cold afternoon Rosecrans prepared to launch a limited counterattack with the troops along the southwestern side of the Nashville Pike. Father Trecy quickly rode out in front of a portion of the line, raised himself in his stirrups, and called out to the men in his stentorious voice to prepare themselves and that he would give them a general absolution. “In an instant all hats were off and the soldiers were on their knees. The scene was indeed striking!”

It is said that on this terrible day, as he did in combat thereafter, Father Trecy carried two canteens; one filled with whiskey, the other water. The whiskey he used as a reviving draught to enable a dying soldier to make his last confession. The water he used to baptize them. Throughout the next 5 days and nights Father Trecy worked unsparingly along with all the rest of the army’s chaplains, Protestant and Catholic alike, to help relieve the suffering of the wounded and dying of both sides.

Conyngham’s complete story of Father Jeremiah F. Trecy, as told to him by Trecy himself, is one of those small, forgotten narratives that never made it into publication, but that do much to recall the immediacy of the times in which those experiences were lived.

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

The General’s Priest

Related posts:

1. This Granger and Steedman Thing!
2. Review: Lincoln’s Political Generals
3. Civil War Generals 2 in XP?

In the great debate of Slavery Vs. State’s rights, there is a new recruit on the field. One who immensely researched letters, diaries, and journals from soldiers on the front line to get, straight from their own mouths, what they as individuals were fighting over.

Chandra Manning’s What This Cruel War was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War is a must have for any serious student of our Civil War. In her book, Manning has combed through thousands of interviews, letters home, diaries and journals to follow the typical Union and Confederate soldier throughout the war, and show how attitudes changed as battles, political and military, were won or lost. In it, she attempts to explain, once and for all, why it is that a southern man with no land, or a man from Maine who has never laid eyes on a black man would fight on his behalf.

Rather than looking at the debate from both sides, Manning takes an exclusive look at soldier’s viewpoints on slavery, addressing why the individual felt it his solemn duty to keep or abolish slavery. Because of such a one sided presentation, I fear that the book itself may be only preaching to the choir, and will fall on deaf ears for those who do not share the views.

One who already shares Manning’s views, will surely learn new connections between slavery and the common foot soldier, but in the end it will only stand to reinforce what he already believed in, and supply more sources to draw on to make get his point across. Although I would hope persons of all viewpoints will learn from this, I believe that many of the “State’s Rights” persuasion will dismiss Manning’s observations as too heavily biased towards the northern cause, or as whitewashing the administration.

For me, however, I think it is an important addition to any body’s library, no matter what their own beliefs may be. In order to understand the war more fully, we must understand why it was fought. Not why the history books say it was fought, not why politicians of the time say it was fought, but why the every day grunt out in the trenches and battlefields say they fought. This is who Chandra Manning addresses, and they are who ultimately paid the price.

Did you enjoy this blog entry?  Subscribe to TOCWOC’s RSS feed today!

Read more Civil War Book Reviews here at TOCWOC!

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

Review: “What this Cruel War was Over”

Related posts:

1. Review: Chancellorsville and the Germans by Christian B. Keller
2. Review: Complicity: How the North Promoted, Prolonged, and Profited from Slavery
3. Civil War Book Review: Creating a Confederate Kentucky

This is a question, that I think is a good one.

And in a way its a tough one to answer. When I got started, there was a far greater emphasis on reading then there is today. And there were well less things to do.

Also I sense that people in their teens don’t enjoy reading like I did. In my introduction I spoke of cutting my teeth on Bruce Catton. Now, some 40 plus years later, would I tell a parent of a 12, 13,14 year to read him? Well first of all unless you go to the library, or maybe a rare book store, his books have just about disappeared from the shelves.. Second, I don’t know if his writings now some what outdated, would hold a reader in their teens.

So what to tell a young person to read?

Landscape Turned Red is a good one. Even though now it has to be over 35 years old. But a good book for some one to get a sense of the Civil War.

James McPherson’s Battle Cry of Freedom is large book to read.

There are several other authors out there. Steve Woodworth’s books. Any of them. Except maybe his one on the Union Army of the Tennessee.

Our own esteemed blogger here as several the are good short concise reads. Eric does a real good job in writing, and pulling you in. And to hold the readers attention.

So what do I recommend then?

I would look at it this way. The book has to be written well. Based on facts that can be collaborated by several sources and not just one or two sentences from A single source. It must read well. As I noted above in Eric’s books as an example. Does it teach? That’s a rare thought these days. Will it encourage the reader to do MORE reading?

I will be posting my favorite list of books in another blog entry along with a 2 part series on one of my favorite characters.

So happy reading to you all.

Jim

Post from: TOCWOC - A Civil War Blog

New to the Civil War? What do I tell “newbies” to read?

Related posts:

1. How To Read Three Gettysburg Books At Once
2. Civil War Books Discussed on the Baltimore Sun’s Read Street Blog
3. A Little Known Way to Read ALL Civil War Blogs in One Place