Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union’s Ethnic Regiments. William L. Burton. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press, 1st Ed., 1988. 282 pp. No maps.

Many people assume that immigrants coming to this country are often harassed and discriminated against solely by “Native” Americans until they assimilate, hence the “melting pot” analogy. William L. Burton sets out to debunk such a black and white approach to the immigrant population of the United States during the Civil War period. He does so within a framework of the Union ethnic regiments raised during the war. The author points out that much of the discrimination of certain ethnic groups was by other ethnic groups, rather than by native-born Americans. The story of these ethnic regiments was also largely a story of political and religious scheming, personal advancement, and to further the reputation one’s own ethnic group as patriotic and loyal Americans. As the war progressed, many ethnic regiments lost their ethnic identities as conscription and lack of ethnic volunteers caused these regiments to become more and more like any other Union regiment. The experiences of the two main ethnic groups, the Germans an the Irish, are compared and contrasted throughout the book, with other groups such as the Scandinavians, the English, the Scotch, the Italians, the French, and others are handled as well.

Burton believes that the political parties of Civil War America embraced rather than discriminated against ethnics. The Know-Nothings and other anti-foreign and anti-immigrant groups were dying out by the time the Civil War started in 1861. In addition, political parties were happy to have famous foreigners such as the German Carl Schurz and the Irishmen Michael Corcoran and James Mulligan. These men tried to align their countrymen with whatever political party they were affiliated with. The Irish tended to be overwhelmingly Catholic and loyal to the Democratic Party. Germans, on the other hand, tended to vote along the same lines as native Americans, with no one religion or political party holding sway. In many cases, fights over ethnicity were not between ethnics and natives, but rather between two different ethnic groups, says the author. Each group basked in the glow of battlefield victories by their units, while also sharing in the shame of any defeat.

The raising of ethnic regiments differed in some cases, but in many ways the characteristics were the same. Many ethnic regiments started the war with a strong ethnic identity. Others, however, had difficulty fulfilling their quotas when an ethnic group did not have a large representation in a given state. The 79th New york Highlanders, ostensibly a Scotch regiment, was from the start made up of people of many different ethnicities. Other regiments, like the 32nd Indiana (German),8th New York (German), and 69th New York (Irish), were almost exclusively composed of one ethnic group at the beginning of the war. One pattern seemed to hold true throughout the war, according to Burton. As disease and bullets took their toll and ethnic heroes were disgraced or disillusioned, the pool of ethnic manpower dropped rapidly. As conscription became the norm, the ethnic character of these regiments slowly disappeared. By the end of the war, many of these regiments were filled with a polyglot collection of different nationalities and religious groups.

The men who led these regiments were as varied as the regiments themselves. Consider August Willich and Louis Blenker, both German immigrants. Willich was a poor Prussian who never did learn to speak English well and who commanded in a down to earth, no-nonsense style. This colonel of the 32nd Indiana led it to great renown as one of the hardest-fighting Union regiments of the war. His countryman Louis (Ludwig) Blenker was a “Forty-Eighter”, a failed revolutionary from the unrest in Germany in 1848. Blenker, a former wine-maker from Worms, led a lavish lifestyle while in the Union Army. His 8th New York was known as somewhat of a “tourist attraction” for their opulent parties and other activities around Washington, D.C. In addition, Blenker had what was essentially an entourage surrounding him at his headquarters. Many German mercenaries and other German notables who could not find a place elsewhere were welcomed into Blenker’s “family”. In fact, Blenker eventually rose to command the only all-German division ever assembled during the Civil War. Two Irishmen show serious contrasts as well. Some men such as Thomas Meagher of Irish Brigade fame were open Fenians, Irishmen who wanted to eventually see the independence of Ireland come by force if necessary. They believed that the Civil War was a perfect proving ground for future soldiers of the Fenian movement. Meagher welcomed his association with the Fenians. Others, such as political mastermind James Mulligan in Chicago, catered privately to the Fenians while publicly denying any involvement with the group. This was to curry favor with the Catholic Church (who despised the Fenians) and to also seem less dangerous to mainstream America. One thing united most of these men as the war went on: ambition. To hold a colonelcy was to wield power, and these men did anything they could to keep their regiments in the field as viable fighting machines. This led, as discussed earlier, to the loss of ethnic identity in regiments. Anyone who wanted to join was welcomed as a way to fill the ranks.

I enjoyed Melting Pot Soldiers, but this book is more of an introduction to the topic rather than a full blown, in-depth study of the various ethnic regiments of the Union army. Weighing in at 282 pages long, Burton’s book does succeed in showing how the various ethnic regiments often experienced the same problems of political intrigue, power-mad individuals within the regiment or outside of its ranks, dissatisfaction with the introduction of other ethnic groups, etc. The author also provides an interesting look at how native-born Americans and ethnics interacted within their own groups and when dealing with other ethnics. Burton’s main point seems to be that these ethnic groups, despite their differences with native-born Americans and with each other, were truly Americans from the beginning. These various groups of people had chosen to come to America from their native lands for one reason or another, and whatever the reason, forged a new American way of life. Burton closes the book by saying, “the best-kept secret of the ethnic regiments is how truly American they were.” Those whose ancestors came to this country and participated in its greatest tragedy will particularly enjoy this book. Those interested in how ethnic populations interacted with native Americans during the war years will also find the book to be a good read. If you are new to this subject and want a solid primer, you cannot go wrong with Melting Pot Soldiers.

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Review in Brief: Melting Pot Soldiers by William L. Burton

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I missed the series of August battles of Grant’s Fourth Offensive due to real life issues, but I’m back with a look at perhaps the North’s best chance to drive Lee out of Petersburg and Richmond between July 30, 1864 and April 2, 1865. The events of September 29, 1864 nearly proved fatal to Lee’s attempts to hold these important cities. Benjamin Butler, commander of the Army of the James, believed (correctly) that the Confederates had very few forces covering the eastern approaches to Richmond, and he devised a plan to take part of the Outer Line of Richmond’s three lines of fortifications. Grant, as was becoming a habit, also decided to send part of the Army of the Potomac west from his newly won gains along the Weldon Railroad at Globe Tavern, hoping to stretch Lee’s already thin line to the breaking point.

Butler’s Army had some success on September 29. Birney led one column (his X Corps) against New Market Heights. The United States Colored Troops under his command distinguished themselves in their attacks at that point, just north of the Deep Bottom bridgehead, earning quite a few Medals of Honor in the process. While this attack was underway, another column of the Army of the James (Ord’s XVIII Corps) was moving forward against Ft. Harrison, a defensive work that was part of Richmond’s Outer Defense Line. Stannard’s Division managed to take the fort, but this was to be the high point of the day. Ord himself was wounded, and the Northern assaults from this point forward, even with reinforcements from Birney’s column, were only able to achieve a stalemate near Ft. Gilmer, northeast of Harrison. To make matters worse, Confederate reinforcements began to arrive and the Federals were forced to pull back to the vicinity of Ft. Harrison. Lee’s attempts to retake the fort the next day ended poorly, and the Federals had gained a toehold on the Outer Line. If things had gone differently, they could have done much more.

Grant’s efforts on the south side of the Appomattox River southwest of Petersburg jumped off on September 30, 1864, a day after Butler’s successful attack. Grant saw that Lee was making an effort to retake Fort Harrison and the Federal occupied portion of the outer line. In order to exploit this, he sent portions of Warren’s V Corps and Parke’s IX Corps, Army of the Potomac west from the vicinity of Globe Tavern. Grant hoped to stretch Lee’s already weak line and possibly gain a foothold on the Boydton Plank Road, one of Lee’s few remaining supply routes. This column encountered the Squirrel Level Line in the area of Poplar Spring Church, and they were easily able to drive away the cavalry force which was attempting to hold it. The next objective was the Boydton Plank Road, but the line here was now held by Harry Heth’s Division, which Lee had been holding as a mobile force to be used in trouble spots. Parke’s IX Corps cautiously moved north towards the Boydton Plank Road, but Heth launched a crushing attack that drove the Union troops away in confusion. Charles Griffin’s V Corps Division helped the rallied portion of the IX Corps finally blunt this attack near Pegram’s Farm, and each side tried unsuccessful attacks over the next few days. The fighting was over, but Grant had gotten that much closer to breaking Lee’s lines.

If you are interested in learning more about the events of late September-early October 1864, I cannot recommend Richard Sommers’ Richmond Redeemed highly enough. The book’s subject is Grant’s Fifth Offensive, including all of the fighting mentioned above. As always, Jim Epperson’s Petersburg Campaign web site is also an excellent place to go to start learning about this subject.
Other sources, courtesy of this list at the United States Army Military History Institute, include:

PEEBLE’S FARM

Sommers, Richard J. “Petersburg Autumn: The Battle of Poplar Spring Church.” In The Confederate High Command and Related Topics: The 1988 Deep Delta Civil War Symposium. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1990. pp. 30 52. E468D42.1988.
FORT HARRISON

Bruce, George A. “Petersburg, June 15 Fort Harrison, September 29: A Comparison.” In Papers of the Mil Hist Soc of MA, Vol. 14, cited above. pp. 83 116. E470M65v14.

Sommers, Richard J. “Fury at Fort Harrison.” CW Times Illus 19 (Oct 1980): pp. 12 23. Per.
NEW MARKET HEIGHTS

Aliyetti, John F. “Gallantry Under Fire.” CW Times Illus 35 (Oct 1996): pp. 50-55. Per. On the Medals of Honor.

Brinsfield, John. “The Battle of New Market Heights.” Soldiers 51 (Feb 1996): pp. 50-52. Per.

Longacre, Edward G., ed. “Edward Ripley Recalls the Battle of New Market Heights.” CW Times Illus 20 (Feb 1982): pp. 38 44. Per.

Popchock, Barry. “A Shower of Stars at New Market Heights.” CW 46 (Aug 1994): pp. 30-31 & 34-39. Per.On the Medals of Honor.

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New Market Heights, Ft. Harrison, and Peeble’s Farm

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Brian Downey has a new blog post up about a subject I mentioned in August — General French’s march away from the West Woods toward the Sunken Lane. This really is the mystery of the battle and I’ve often wondered why so many historians have sort of passed over it with little or no comment. For whatever reason French changed his axis of advance nearly 90 degrees. French seems to have had a problem with being where he was supposed to be, and eventually got canned after Mine Run for it.

Downey, who points out that Antietam was a terrain-driven battle, went out and walked the ground and has some interesting takes on it.

This is rough country to walk. Up and down, up and down, with 3 steep ridges and corresponding valleys across your track between the East Woods and Antietam Creek. The ‘modern’ road through there is only an asphalt farm track, about 1-1/2 car widths. This would have been difficult marching.Between the elevation changes and the trees, visibility is rarely more than a few hundred yards in any direction. I think General French was very much alone out there once he lost contact with Sedgwick.

He posits that both French and Richardson advanced through a ravine after losing touch with Sedgwick, in essence because it was the easiest way to go. Brian helpfully includes a map with the possible routes outlined.

Possible…but I’d like to see a comparison of the tree cover then and now (which is often quite different), and to have some idea of what was visible not only on the ground but from horseback.

The obvious objections are that first, French says in his report (quoted on Brian’s blog) that he had “cleared the ford a mile” before changing direction. That would put him far past the ravine. Second, we know that French advanced toward the left side of the Sunken Road, which is consistent with his description of where he was and hard to square with his using the ravine. With Richardson’s division (which attacked the right side) it fits perfectly.

Still, French says that he formed up “adjacent to and contiguous with Sedgwick’s” division, which is highly unlikely. Much more likely, as I said before, that due to the number of green regiments and their slow marching he had lost touch with Sedgwick altogether. Surely it didn’t take an Indian scout to see where an entire division had gone, and why would he take off across country?

I think there’s much more to be done here, and I plan at some time in the future to check some lower level sources — manuscripts, letters, and the like — to get a better feel for what was going on. But thanks, Brian, for taking the time to walk the ground. Perhaps we will solve this riddle, but I suspect the answer is forever locked inside the head of General French.

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That Antietam Anomaly

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Yankee Autumn In Acadiana: A Narrative of the Great Texas Overland Expedition through Southwestern Louisiana October-December 1863. David C. Edmonds. Lafayette, LA: Center For Louisiana Studies, 2005.
495 pp. 21 maps, numerous illustarions.

The term “narrative” is a fitting one for David C. Edmonds’ Yankee Autumn in Acadiana. This book is at its heart a story of the suffering of the population of southwestern Louisiana along Bayou Teche. The Yankee invasion along that waterway from early October to December 1863 produced few pitched battles, but the war was no less terrible in the area as a result of this fact. The author, himself a resident of the area when the book was originally written in 1979, has obviously done a lot of research on the citizens and history of the area, and he relates their often poignant stories with the skill of an accomplished storyteller. This version of the book is a paperback reprint of the extremely hard to find (and expensive!) hardcover edition. The maps, although numerous, are mostly unsatisfactory, though so many illustrations dot the pages that the maps’ shortcomings are somewhat alleviated. Edmonds sets out to chronicle the path of the Yankee swarm and the path of destruction left in its wake.

General Nathaniel P. Banks was under enormous pressure in the fall of 1863 to plant the United States flag in Texas. Emperor Napoleon of France had installed Maxilmilian as the puppet Emperor of Mexico, and the Lincoln administration wanted to show France that the Monroe Doctrine was still in effect, war or no war. An overland expedition to Texas was decided upon, and in early October 1863 the Union Army of the Gulf moved to Brashear City, Louisiana. Brashear was located along the Atchafalaya River, into which Bayou Teche empties. The Army of the Gulf consisted of the Union XIII Corps, XIX Corps, and Lee’s Cavalry Division. It was an army that would fight almost as much with itself as with the enemy. The western XIII Corps, victors of the Vickburg Campaign, were also ill-disciplined and prone to looting. The more polished easterners of the XIX Corps tended to be more restrained in their foraging expeditions. Each group disliked the other, and this situation was at times so bad that William Franklin, the commander of the expedition for most of its duration, even separated the camps of the two Corps by several miles.

Passing through towns such as Franlin, New Iberia, Vermilion (present day Lafayette), and Opelousas, the Yankees were constantly harassed by Tom Green’s Cavalry Division and other troops in Richard Taylor’s small Army of Western Louisiana. Taylor, an agressive son of a President, was held in check by Edmund Kirby Smith, commander of the Trans-Mississippi Department. Smith wanted to pursue a “Fabian” policy of retreat and denial of resources to the enemy, whereas Taylor wanted to forcibly drive the enemy out of the area. Chafing under these orders, Taylor nonetheless grudgingly followed his commander’s orders. Other COnfederate forces under John Magruder in Texas were not sent to aid Taylor, because they (rightly) suspected that the true goal of this expedition was eastern Texas. In addition, these troops were needed to protect against possible coastal invasions of Texas by other Union forces.

As a result of all of this, there were very few pitched battles. The largest was the engagement along Bayou Bourbeux on November 3, 1863, in which an infantry and cavalry brigade under Gen. Stephen Burbridge were surprised by Confederate cavalry, with many Yankees being captured. Despite the large number of captured, the killed and wounded on each side were surprisingly equal. In any event, by the time this battle was fought, Banks had already decided to siphon troops off from the expedition and use them to attack the Texas coast. He succeeded in taking a few isolated points, but the failure of the overland expedition was by this time apparent. Although the Yankees managed to surprise and capture a few Confederate outposts during their withdrawal from Opelousas to New Iberia, the reputations of men such as Franklin and Banks were irrettievably harmed.

The biggest effect of this great raid, as it turned out to be, was felt by the Cajun and French citizens along the route of advance and retreat. They had felt the wrath of the Yankee army in the spring of 1863, and now Banks had decided to use the same route on his way to Texas. Despite protestations of neutrality or of allegiance to the Union, most of the plantations and other farms along the Teche were virtually destroyed. Crops were consumed, livestock and other animals taken, homes and other buildings burned or their wood used for bridges or shelter for the Union troops. Many people were left with empty homes, no food or money, and only literally the clothes on their back. After reading several studies on the Red River Campaign, one is struck by the horrible reputation of the XIII Corps for utter destruction. The stories in this book only serve to back up that reputation. The bummers of Sherman’s March to the Sea had nothing on the men of the XIII Corps! Though the XIX Corps was more restrained, they also had a large hand in the devastation of the entire region. Even more pitiful are the stories of thoise who took the Oath of Allegiance hoping to save their farms and property. Not only were these citizens still robbed, but they were also scorned by their neighbors after the Yankees had left. Author Edmonds mentions that this situation created feuds among families that took generations to heal. The outcome along the entire invasion route told the same story of detruction, despair, and sometimes even death.

Though there are numerous maps in the book (21 by my count), many appear to be xeroxed portions of old county maps that are almost impossible to decipher without a period map of the region. The books seems to be aimed at inhabitants of the region, so they may have a much easier time than I did. Luckily, I managed to find an excellent 1863 map of southwestern Louisiana at the Library of COngress web site that even shows what appears to be Banks’ invasion route of that spring. After becoming acquainted with the area, I was able to follow along reasonably well. In a way, the maps are not as bad as I make them out to be. This is more a story of the citizens and their suffering than it is of a military campaign. It suffices to say that the Army of the Gulf was heading in a generally north-northwest direction along the western side of Bayou Teche and that the Confederates of Richard Taylor’s army were generally to their north for most of the expedition. The battle maps were mostly better, with units going down to the regimental level in many places. However, these hand drawn maps were sometimes very small and appear handwritten, which is a bit of a drawback.

The illustrations, though in black and white (I’m sure to save costs), were numerous and excellent. In additon to including quite a few contemporary drawings from Harpers Weekly, the author managed to take quite a few present-day (actually late 1970s) photos of houses and other relevant buildings along the invasion route. Drawings and photos of prominent personalities were also included. Few books I’ve read have included as many excellent and on-topic illustrations as this one. They truly deserve high marks and accentuate the text.

Edmonds sets out to chronicle this little known invasion of southwestern Louisiana and succeeds admirably. This narrative of the Great Texas Overland Expedition is storytelling at its finest, and I look forward to reading Edmonds’ two-volume accounbt of the Siege of Port Hudson. The author formerly resided in the area, and his attention to detail and treasure trove of sources are evident in his retelling of this tragic tale for the citizens of this area, caught between the two warring sides and preyed upon by not only regular troops but lawless bands of “jayhawkers” as well. This book is a must-own for those interested in the Civil War in Louisiana, the war in the Trans-Mississippi, and how citizens in the path of conflict can sometimes be made to suffer, innocent though they may be.

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Review: Yankee Autumn in Acadiana by David C. Edmonds

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Drew Wagenhoffer has an interview with John Fox, chronicler of the Thirty-fifth Georgia. Worth reading, as John and I independently had many of the same unfortunate experiences with the publishing industry, which led us both to the same conclusion about doing it ourselves. I’ve gotten to know John pretty well, since as fellow micropublishers we have had a lot to talk about. I look forward to his next book.

I’m off to Rocky Mount, NC, tomorrow for a talk to the Dorsey Pender CWRT. Looking forward to the talk, but not the drive, which takes me through both Greensboro and Raleigh.

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Interview With John Fox

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Thanks to Brett I recently picked up a nice little battle monograph – Disaster in the West Woods, General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam, by Marion V. Armstrong (Western Maryland Interpretive Association 2002). At 77 pages it’s short, but a worthwhile read for anyone interested in Antietam. Right now it’s on sale for half price ($4.97) at the Antietam book store. In fact, the shipping will cost you more than the book. Armstrong takes a detailed, literally step by step look at what befell the US II Corps at Antietam, as well as assessing Major General Edwin Sumner’s leadership.

Overall I was very impressed by Armstrong’s contribution, although I differ with him on Sumner’s generalship and some other matters, which I will discuss. In addition to tracking the positions of various units, Armstrong (a former Army officer turned military historian) provides both modern-day photographs and descriptions of what Sumner would have seen when approaching the West Woods.

With forty-three years of active service in the regular army Edwin Vose “Bull” Sumner was one of the Army’s most experienced soldiers, and at sixty-five years of age, one of the oldest. A colonel when the war began, he had risen rapidly to major general, and had performed credibly in the Peninsular campaign. His highest prewar combat command had been at company level in Mexico, and at regimental level during some Indian campaigns. At Antietam he commanded II Corps, comprised of three divisions. One of these divisions, that commanded by Brigadier General William French, had only recently joined the corps and was composed in large part of new units, many of which had been in the service only six weeks.

Alerted on the morning of the battle, Sumner (who was, in theory, a Grand Division commander) chafed as he waited for orders while the corps of Major General Joseph Hooker (I Corps) and Major General Joseph Mansfield (XII Corps) went in at dawn. The fighting swayed back and forth, with both Hooker and Mansfield being carried from the field wounded. By the time Sumner crossed Antietam creek in mid-morning, both these corps had been driven back in disarray by Stonewall Jackson’s command.

With Sedgwick’s division in the lead, II Corps crossed Antietam creek and advanced toward the West Wood through the debris of I and XII Corps. His concept of the operation (to use a modern term) was to have French’s division advance forward to cover Sedgwick’s left, and then the two divisions would attack, with the third division (commanded by Major General Israel Richardson) behind them in the classic “two-up, one-back” formation. He seems to have communicated this to both French and Richardson.

Nevertheless, Sumner made two critical mistakes early on. One was to be too far forward personally, and the other was to fail to factor in the lack of experience of French’s men. Sumner, whose personal courage was beyond question, actually rode at times in front of Sedgwick’s division (which was deployed in line), trying to make sense of the confused and fluid tactical situation. This was certainly understandable given the uncertainties of the day, but it left him vulnerable to sharpshooters and made him unaware of what transpired next.

French’s division had crossed the creek behind Sedgwick’s, and while this was normally not a terribly challenging maneuver, it was difficult for men (and officers) new to the military. Just moving several thousand men, even away from a battle, is a difficult proposition without an experienced, smoothly-functioning chain of command, which most of French’s regiments just did not have as yet. Thus by the time French’s division had crossed and reformed into battle formation, Sedgwick’s division was out of sight.

When Sedgwick’s division began fighting Sumner remained at the front, attempting to coordinate the battle, which included fragments of other corps (e.g. Brigadier General George Greene’s command, near the Dunker Church) and becoming far too involved in its conduct, which he should have left to his subordinates.

Over the past twenty years I’ve spent quite a bit of my time training EMS leaders to deal with large, complex incidents like floods. These are, in many ways, very similar to military operations. One of the most common mistakes that ICs (that’s EMS-speak for Incident Commander) make is to become too involved in the actual “hands-on” running of the event so that they lose sight of the overall picture. This is where I differ with Armstrong, who thinks that Sumner was justified in being forward. It’s pretty obvious, however, that Sumner became caught up in the battle (an easy thing to do), ordering individual brigades and even regiments around. In the process he eventually completely lost track of two-thirds of his command, the two fresh divisions that might have made the difference, and fought Jackson with only a third of his combat power. The result was catastrophic – Sedgwick’s division was cut to pieces and John Sedgwick himself severely wounded.

There are two things that can be considered in Sumner’s defense. First, if he had ridden off the rear he might have seemed like cowardice and demoralized the men. Second, when Sedgwick was wounded he was the only man with enough authority to command both Sedgwick’s division and the remnants of the other corps. While there is truth to both of these, his first responsibility as a commander was to be where he could control his corps. Had he attacked as planned, with two fresh divisions abreast and a third in support, even Stonewall Jackson would have been hard pressed to hold out.

The book itself is soft cover, 6×9″, with a number of informative maps and an index. However an order of battle, at least of II Corps, would have been helpful.

Next, we’ll look at one of the enduring mysteries of the battle. Why did Sumner’s two other division take off on their own and attack the Sunken Road?

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Disaster in the West Woods

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In the past month and a half, I’ve marked the anniversaries of important battles during the Petersburg Campaign (and I apologize for missing the Wilson-Kautz Raid and First Deep Bottom). When Petersburg does manage to get mentioned, arguably the most “popular” battle (you have to include Five Forks as well) is the Crater, fought on July 30, 1864. Col. Henry Pleasants and the coal miners of his 48th Pennsylvania dug a lengthy tunnel and planted several groups of explosives below the Confederate works. At 4:45 A.M., these explosives went off, creating a huge crater and blowing quite a few Confederates into eternity. The assault was a debacle. James Ledlie, the division commander expected to lead the attack, instead hunkered down in a bombproof getting quite drunk. Ledlie’s command wasn’t even supposed to be leading in the first place. Ferrero’s Division of United States Colored Troops had originally drawn that duty and had trained for weeks. Grant and Meade, fearing a backlash in the press if the Black troops led the attack and were slaughtered, put an end to this idea only a day or so before the explosion was to take place. Burnside incredibly had the commanders of his three white divisions draw straws! Unfortunately, Burnside couldn’t have picked a worse man for the job. As the Union troops milled about in and just in front of the Crater, a vicious counterattack by several Brigade’s of William Mahone’s Division crested at the edge of the massive hole. There followed a possible massacre of black troops, a massacre that seems highly likely given the ratio of killed to wounded in the USCT regiments comparedx to their white counterparts. See especially Bryce Suderow’s article in Civil War History below for specifics on the massacre. In the end, many of the Union troops surrendered or ran the gauntlet back to their lines. The IX Corps had wasted a golden opportunity to break through and shorten the war.

Rather than just give you the books, articles, and web sites I know of, I’ve decided from now on to instead use the excellent bibliographies from the United States Army Military History Institute. The Petersburg Bibliography is located at:

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usamhi/Bibliographies/ReferenceBibliographies/CivilWar/battles/1864/east/Petersburg.doc.doc

The list of titles and articles focusing on The Crater are listed below in alphabetical order by authors’ last name:

“Battle of the Crater, July 30, 1864, Roster of the Members of the 12th Infantry, Mahone’s Brigade, Who Were Engaged.” Southern Hist Soc Papers 31 (1903): pp. 271 74.

Bernard, George S. The Battle of the Crater. Petersburg, VA: Fenn & Owen, 1892. 81 p.

_______. “Great Battle of the Crater, the Work of Mahone and Weisinger at the Fight.” Southern Hist Soc Papers 28 (1900): pp. 204 21.

_______. comp. War Talks of Confederate Veterans and Battle of the Crater. Petersburg, VA: Fenn &
Owen, 1892. 335 p. E484B5.

Bowley, Freeman S. “The Petersburg Mine.” In War Papers (MOLLUS, CA, Paper 3). 17 p.

Burbank, Horace N. “The Battle of ‘the Crater.’” In War Papers (MOLLUS, Maine, Vol. 1). Portland, ME: Thurston, 1898. pp. 283 94.

Calkins, Chris. “The Preservation Report: A History of the Crater Battlefield.” CW Regts Vol. 2, #1: pp. 156 58. Per.

Case, Ervin T. Battle of the Mine. Providence, RI: S.S. Rider, 1879. 37 p.

Cavanaugh, Michael A. The Battle of the Crater, “The Horrid Pit,” June 25 August 6, 1864. Lynchburg, VA: H.E. Howard, 1989. 181 p.

_______. “The Battle of the Crater, July 30, 1864, Petersburg, Virginia, Includes Action at Deep Bottom, Virginia, July 26 to 29, 1864.” n.p., n.d. 60 p.

Chase, James. The Charge at Day break: Scenes and Incidents at the Battle of the Mine Explosion Near Petersburg, Va., July 30, 1864. Lewiston, ME: Lewiston Journal Office, 1873. 32 p.

Featherston, John C. Battle of the Crater. Birmingham, AL: Birmingham Pub Co, 1987. 30 p.

George, Larry. “Battle of the Crater: A Combat Engineer Case Study.” Mil Review 64 (Feb 1984): pp. 35 47. Per.

James, Alfred P. “Battle of the Crater, Petersburg, Va., June 30, 1864.” Journal of the Amer Mil Hist Foundation 2 (1938): pp. 1 25. Per MilAffairs.

Kinard, Jeff. The Battle of the Crater. Abilene, TX: McMurray U, 1998. 101 p.

Marvel, William. “And Fire Shall Devour Them: The 9th New Hampshire Infantry and the Crater.” CW Regts Vol. 2, #2: pp. 118 40. Per.

Newberry, Walter C. “The Petersburg Mine.” In Military Essays and Recollections (MOLLUS, IL, Vol. 3). Chicago: Dial Pr, 1899. pp. 111 24.

Parker, E. K. “‘The Bravest Deed I Ever Knew’: The Negro Boy at the Petersburg Enclosure.” Century Magazine.

Pleasants, Henry. The Tragedy of the Crater. Petersburg, VA: ENP&MA, 1975. 101 p.

Porter, Charles H. “The Petersburg Mine.” In Papers of the Mil Hist Soc of MA, Vol. 5, cited above. pp. 221 40.

Razza, Michael S. “The Man Behind the Mine: The Short, Unhappy Life of Henry Pleasants…” Civ War 57 (Jun 1996): pp. 22-23 & 25-27. Per.

Skoch, George F. “Thunder From Below.” America’s CW 1 (Jul 1988): pp. 26 33. Per.

Shearman, Sumner U. Battle of the Crater and Experiences of Prison Life. Providence, RI: RI Soldiers & Sailors Hist Soc, 1898. 38 p.

Slayden, William M. “The Battle of the Crater.” Army 7 (Oct 1956): pp. 41 45. Per.

Stewart, William H. “The Charge at the Crater: A Graphic Account of the Memorable Action.” Southern Hist Soc Papers 25 (1897): pp. 77 90.

Suderow, Bryce A. “The Battle of the Crater: The Civil War’s Worst Massacre.” CW Hist 43 (Sep 1997): pp. 219-24. Per.

Taylor, John M. “The Crater.” MHQ 10 (Winter 1998): pp. 30-39. Per.

Weld, Stephen M. “The Petersburg Mine.” In Papers of the Mil Hist Soc of MA, Vol. 5, cited above. pp. 205 20.

Wilkinson, Warren. “Bury Them if They Won’t Move.” [57th MA] CW Times Illus 29 (Mar/Apr 1990): pp. 24 34 & 43 45. Per.

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The Battle of the Crater, July 30, 1864

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Ride With The Devil

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The Complete Short Stories of Ambrose Bierce Paperback: 496 pages Publisher: University of Nebraska Press; Reprint edition (January 1985) Language: English ISBN: 0803260717 Brett’s Horror Book Collection

Last Sunday, I mentioned that I would be going through this short story collection of writer Ambrose Bierce, a Civil War veteran. Bierce was an uncompromising man with a “rapier” sharp wit, and he was a master of satire. His Devil’s Dictionary is a master work of cynicism and satire. Bierce was deeply affected by the war, and he became disillusioned with the Gilded Age society of his day. Bierce’s stories can be (and are for the purposes of this work) roughly divided into three categories: horror, war, and “tall tales”, in that order. For that reason, most of the stories you will see here for the first several blog entries in this series will be horror. If these are uninteresting to some or many of you, I apologize in advance. However, I hope to both introduce some of you to Bierce’s work and change up my usual posting habits with this series. I want to mention that the “rankings” below are my own personal feelings about a given story. Critics may have loved it, but if I do not I will definitely say so. If you have read these stories, let me know what you personally think of them as well. And finally, I’d love to hear from you on whether or not you want this series to continue.

Note: In the forward to the horror section of Bierce’s stories, the compiler notes that “Haita The Shepherd” is not a horror story, but that he placed it at the front of the book because it could not be classified as horror, war or a tall tale. I have placed it above the horror section for this reason.

“Haita The Shepherd”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 7/10
Quote: “Unfortunate youth! But for thine indiscretion thou mightst have had her for two.”

Comments: Haita the Shepherd finds happiness to be fleeting, especially when he seeks it out with a purpose. This one is more of a fable than anything else, though it seems a little tough to classify. Interestingly, this is the first mention of the god Hastur, who later was to become a staple in H. P. Lovecraft’s Cthulhu Mythos. I also happen to be a fan of Lovecraft, so this was a surprisingly recognizable name to see, given that Bierce stopped writing several decades before HPL and his friends began writing mythos stories.

Part I: The World of Horror

“The Secrets of Macarger’s Gulch”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 8/10
Quote: “By the way, the name of the gulch is a corruption; it should have been called ‘MacGregor’s.’”

Comments: I enjoyed this short little ghost story. Bierce’s wry humor comes through as the host of dinner describes certain key facts, upsetting the protagonist and causing him to drop his wine, insert a chicken bone into a finger dish, and pepper his coffee!

“The Eyes of the Panther”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 9/10
Quote: “Very well, you shall know: I am insane.”

Comments: Who (or maybe more accurately WHAT) was Irene’s father? I loved the way Bierce didn’t just come out and reveal the ending of this story with a direct description of events.

“The Stranger”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 9/10
Quote: “There were four. Ramon Gallegos, William Shaw, George W. Kent, and Berry Davis.”

Comments: A camp of “gentlemen adventurers” is confronted by a stranger out in the desert, and he tells them an interesting story. The last line of this story (I don’t want to give it away) will make you laugh out loud, more than likely.

“An Inhabitant of Carcosa”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 5/10
Quote: “Good stranger, I am ill and lost. Direct me, I beseech you, to Carcosa.”

Comments: This is a ghost story with a twist, but I didn’t particularly care for it. The first paragraph or so give away the ending if you are an attentive reader. Yes, I am aware that this is considered one of Bierce’s best stories, in case you were wondering.

“The Applicant”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 10/10
Quote: “Under the circumstances, the decision–”

Comments: This is irony at its finest. Bierce’s description of Christmas Day as “that blessed 365th part of the year that all Christian souls set apart for mighty feats of goodness and joy” and Santa’s visits as “the annual falsehood about the hunch-bellied saint who frequents the chimneys to reward little boys and girls who are good, and especially truthful” show in a small way some of the author’s cynical, satiric nature. This is a very short story, but the last sentence is the key.

“The Death of Halpin Frayser”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 8/10
Quote: “That sounds like Bayne.”

Comments: Halpin Frayser dreams he is murdered by a most unlikely source. But does he dream? And is he murdered? And who is Larue? I found this one interesting for its early mention of the term “lich”.

“A Watcher by the Dead”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 7/10
Quote: “It strikes me, youngster, that you and I have been having too much of the morning air lately. It is unwholesome; we need a change. What do you say to a tour in Europe?”

Comments: Two doctors make a bet regarding the possibility of a man surviving a night alone in a room with only a corpse for company. A third doctor, their friend, decides to play the “corpse”, with some rather interesting results.

“The Man and the Snake”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 10/10
Quote: “Good God! How did this thing get in here?”

Comments: This is another Bierce story whose ending changes your whole perception of what you’ve just read. That’s all I’ll say, as I don’t want to give too much away.

“John Mortonson’s Funeral”
By Ambrose Bierce
Rating: 7/10
Quote: “She threw up her arms with a shriek and afterwards fell back insensible.”

Comments: This one is a VERY short story of a man’s funeral and the chaos that ensues. Bierce again delivers something completely against the reader’s expectation with the very last sentence of the story.

Although I had heard a lot about Bierce’s short stories, especially “The Damned Thing” and “An Occurrence at Owl Creek Bridge”, I had no idea he wrote this many horror stories, and he is rapidly moving up the list of my personal favorite authors of horror. He sounds like Edgar Allan Poe in some cases, but Bierce stands well on his own. You can almost see him smiling as he writes these stories. Look for more of Bierce’s horror stories over the next two or three weeks. After that we’ll move into his war stories and his tall tales. In all, the book contains around 90 stories, so I envision this series going for 9 or so weeks.

Part 1 – Part 2 – Part 3 – Part 4 – Part 5 – Part 6

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The Complete Short Stories of Ambrose Bierce, Part 1

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Books on Confederate Armies

Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History. Richard M. McMurry. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press (1989). 204 pp. 1 map.

Richard McMurry takes a look at the two largest armies in the Confederacy in what is, as the title indicates, an extended essay. The Army of Northern Virginia, ably led by Robert E. Lee, was able to compile a large number of impressive victories during the war. The Army of Tennessee, led by various men of less than stellar ability, was only able to win at Chickamauga, and even that victory proved barren strategically. The author considers various factors that affected the two, including geography, logistical concerns, leadership on all levels (particularly among lower level officers), pre-war militia systems in Virginia and Tennessee, and even the Federals who faced each army. He concludes that in every case, the Army of Northern Virginia benefited from these factors while the Army of Tennessee was negatively affected. I have seen it stated in several places that McMurry is saying that the men of the Army of Northern Virginia were better than the men of the Army of Tennessee. I did not get this sense from my reading of the book. Instead, McMurry is stressing that the men in leadership positions in each army were very different. The vast majority of the men who had graduated from military schools such as West Point, VMI, and the Citadel were concentrated in the Army of Northern Virginia to that army’s immense benefit. The Army of Tennessee started out with many men who were untrained in the art of war, and that army’s problems were exacerbated as casualties started to deprive it of even the small number of leaders who had that previous military experience. In other words, McMurry believes the raw material was there to work with, but the Army of Tennessee did not have experienced men available in large enough numbers to work with this raw material.

The last chapter of the book discusses the views of historians Thomas Connelly and Albert Castel on Robert E. Lee and also looks at the ways in which the Confederate government, specifically Jefferson Davis, could have prosecuted the war. McMurry sides with Castel in defending Lee from Connelly’s attacks, and stresses that the Confederates were right to try to win the war in the east. With that said, the author believes the war was eventually won in the west by the Federals. I found it somewhat odd that McMurry would quote Connelly’s entirely negative opinions on the western generals and agree with them while at the same time defending Lee from the same negative opinions. In a way, this did make sense, as it fits McMurry’s own views on the generals of each theater. Perhaps Connelly is just a negative historian in general, however. Reading this book has increased my interest in Connelly’s two volume history of the Army of Tennessee, and that set has moved much higher up my reading list as a result.

Overall, I enjoyed McMurry’s short work, finishing it over one weekend in just three sittings. It really is startling to see how many trained military men ended up in the Army of Northern Virginia for various reasons at the expense of other Confederate armies. Likewise, it was illuminating to see all of the other advantages, intentional or otherwise, which were routinely provided to the Confederacy’s largest army. This particular book is directed at students of these two largest Confederate armies and of Confederate grand strategy during the Civil War. I definitely recommend it to any student of the war.

204 pp., 1 map.

© Copyright Brett Schulte 2006. All rights reserved.

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Review In Brief: Two Great Rebel Armies: An Essay in Confederate Military History by Richard McMurry

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