Comments on: The Artillery Charge http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2008/10/04/the-artillery-charge/ Informed Amateurs Blog the American Civil War Wed, 08 Feb 2012 20:01:41 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v= By: RJ Samp http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2008/10/04/the-artillery-charge/comment-page-1/#comment-15550 RJ Samp Sun, 27 Nov 2011 15:07:44 +0000 http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/?p=1906#comment-15550 1. CSA Brown's 6 pounder's were moved up closer to the Pickett's Charge zenith.....July 3rd 1863, Gettysburg PA. Federal Artillery quickly put them out of action, forced them to retreat. 2. the CSA Artillery Charge to the Peach Orchard July 2nd 1863 Gettysburg PA was out of LOS\LOF of Federal infantry and Artillery for the most part....at best their were better targets of opportunity\more pressing need to not fire long range at the Peach Orchard. I've often wondered why they never wheeled guns up at close range.....Sunken Road at Antietam.....2nd Manassas assaults against the railroad cut.....Brawner's Farm (2nd Manassas) left flank. Push the guns forwards whilst the infantry was being mauled\closer to you and presenting themselves as the higher priority target....retreat your infantry just past the gun line and triple canistering everything to oblivion out to a range of 200 yards.... 3. The CSA Sharpshooter battalions did yeoman's work against many Federal Artillery pieces\positions. This was targetted at individuals direct fire (not firing at the horses, not firing at 'the battery'). 4. US Marines during WWI used aimed rifle fire to take out machine guns....bloody work to be sure. 1. CSA Brown’s 6 pounder’s were moved up closer to the Pickett’s Charge zenith…..July 3rd 1863, Gettysburg PA. Federal Artillery quickly put them out of action, forced them to retreat.

2. the CSA Artillery Charge to the Peach Orchard July 2nd 1863 Gettysburg PA was out of LOS\LOF of Federal infantry and Artillery for the most part….at best their were better targets of opportunity\more pressing need to not fire long range at the Peach Orchard.

I’ve often wondered why they never wheeled guns up at close range…..Sunken Road at Antietam…..2nd Manassas assaults against the railroad cut…..Brawner’s Farm (2nd Manassas) left flank. Push the guns forwards whilst the infantry was being mauled\closer to you and presenting themselves as the higher priority target….retreat your infantry just past the gun line and triple canistering everything to oblivion out to a range of 200 yards….

3. The CSA Sharpshooter battalions did yeoman’s work against many Federal Artillery pieces\positions. This was targetted at individuals direct fire (not firing at the horses, not firing at ‘the battery’).

4. US Marines during WWI used aimed rifle fire to take out machine guns….bloody work to be sure.

]]> By: Bryn Monnery http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2008/10/04/the-artillery-charge/comment-page-1/#comment-5752 Bryn Monnery Sun, 20 Sep 2009 14:06:11 +0000 http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/?p=1906#comment-5752 I've been reading up on this subject myself recently. My survey of the Napoleonic "artillery charge" has led me to the conclusion that no such beast ever really existed. At Freidland then "artillery charge" was an act of desperation due to having no cavalry to hand to pursue a broken enemy. Examining other "artillery charges" showed most were no such thing. So if the artillery charge has no basis in Napoleonic warfare then what about Mexico? The classic example of a "flying battery"* action is Palo Alto; however the range here that the batteries unlimbered was about 600 yards, which was reckoned at the time to be the extreme effective range of 6 pdrs**. There seems no basis in history here for an artillery charge. A survey of ranges from the OR on the Battle of Antietam showed that when artillery unlimbered 300 yds from the enemy it did so successfully and with no impact on their effectiveness from enemy fire. However, when artillery tried unlimbering at 150 yds they suffered heavily from "sharpshooters" and their position was untenable. * A US flying battery was essentially a normal European foot, or field artillery battery. Throughout the period from 1820's-1880's (excepting the ACW) each US artillery regiment had a single company trained as field artillery, one serving as a depot whilst the other 10 coys were organised as a conventional infantry battalion. By 1885 each regiment had 2 batteries (the second being converted from th depot), and it wasn't until 1898 that the US artillery was relieved of the requirement to field an infantry battalion out of each artillery regiment. ** 6 pdrs = 600 yds, 9 pdrs = 800 yds and 12 pdrs = 900 yds I’ve been reading up on this subject myself recently. My survey of the Napoleonic “artillery charge” has led me to the conclusion that no such beast ever really existed. At Freidland then “artillery charge” was an act of desperation due to having no cavalry to hand to pursue a broken enemy. Examining other “artillery charges” showed most were no such thing.

So if the artillery charge has no basis in Napoleonic warfare then what about Mexico? The classic example of a “flying battery”* action is Palo Alto; however the range here that the batteries unlimbered was about 600 yards, which was reckoned at the time to be the extreme effective range of 6 pdrs**. There seems no basis in history here for an artillery charge.

A survey of ranges from the OR on the Battle of Antietam showed that when artillery unlimbered 300 yds from the enemy it did so successfully and with no impact on their effectiveness from enemy fire. However, when artillery tried unlimbering at 150 yds they suffered heavily from “sharpshooters” and their position was untenable.

* A US flying battery was essentially a normal European foot, or field artillery battery. Throughout the period from 1820′s-1880′s (excepting the ACW) each US artillery regiment had a single company trained as field artillery, one serving as a depot whilst the other 10 coys were organised as a conventional infantry battalion. By 1885 each regiment had 2 batteries (the second being converted from th depot), and it wasn’t until 1898 that the US artillery was relieved of the requirement to field an infantry battalion out of each artillery regiment.

** 6 pdrs = 600 yds, 9 pdrs = 800 yds and 12 pdrs = 900 yds

]]> By: Dean West http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/2008/10/04/the-artillery-charge/comment-page-1/#comment-1521 Dean West Sat, 18 Oct 2008 18:38:48 +0000 http://www.brettschulte.net/CWBlog/?p=1906#comment-1521 In "Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War" (published in 2003), historian Brent Nosworthy analyzed the effectiveness of the rifle-musket in great detail and very convincingly. Paddy Griffith was the first to challenge the prevailing idea that the rifle-musket vastly altered black powder era warfare, but Nosworthy was the first one to explain the technical and human reasons to support Griffith's theory. It appears there is quite a buzz suggesting the Earl Hess has broken new ground on the subject of rifle-musket effectiveness, but Nosworthy anticipated him by five years and his scholarship is superb. "Bloody Crucible" received excellent reviews, even from the reenacting community, and I cannot understand why his groundbreaking analysis of rifle-musket effectiveness is not better known by serious students of Civil War tactics. In “Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War” (published in 2003), historian Brent Nosworthy analyzed the effectiveness of the rifle-musket in great detail and very convincingly. Paddy Griffith was the first to challenge the prevailing idea that the rifle-musket vastly altered black powder era warfare, but Nosworthy was the first one to explain the technical and human reasons to support Griffith’s theory. It appears there is quite a buzz suggesting the Earl Hess has broken new ground on the subject of rifle-musket effectiveness, but Nosworthy anticipated him by five years and his scholarship is superb. “Bloody Crucible” received excellent reviews, even from the reenacting community, and I cannot understand why his groundbreaking analysis of rifle-musket effectiveness is not better known by serious students of Civil War tactics.

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