If you check the description in Pfanz, it describes Johnson’s division as arriving close to sundown and then deploying after sundown and by the light of the moon. I believe Martin also matches this description, though I don’t have that volume at hand.

As it was, Johnson’s division would have been attacking in isolation: no help was forthcoming from Longstreet or Hill’s troops, Rhodes wasn’t willing, and Early seemed unenthused, as well as having two brigades diverted elsewhere.

So what happens if Johnson attacks and it’s a disaster?

Johnson’s Division was not engaged in combat that day, and my point is that they were not exhausted, certainly not like Rodes or Early’s men were from marching AND fighting. As far is “in the dark”, it stays light until almost 9:00pm in July in that part of Gettysburg, and believe it or not, its very light by 5:30am.

I read Pfanz several years ago, but have not read Gallagher. I have reviewed the OR’s for the 1st days battle (nothing like a primary source), and also read David Martin’s “Gettysburg July 1″ which is very detailed even down to the regimental level. Hope that helps! Thanks.

Any attack on Culp’s Hill would have been made in the dark by exhausted troops in the face of opposition – a recipe for disaster. And it most likely would have been one. Then what do you do?

Tell me, what have you read on the subject? Have you read Pfanz’s First Day or Gallagher’s essay “Confederate Corps Leadership on the First Day at Gettysburg” in Three Days at Gettysburg?

– IIRC, Ewell had received conflicting reports of Union troops coming from the east, not just the south. Had he lined up his forces to assault the hill, there existed a danger that he’d be flanked in mid-assault by newly arriving Union troops. Again, yet another reason why you don’t let your cavalry leave you while in enemy territory .

– Don’t forget how Ewell got his job. Just two months previously the Confederacy had lost its best corps commander in the confusion of a night attack. After the first day’s success at Gettysburg, not only were Confederate forces elated by their success (they smashed two Union corps), they were probably reluctant to press the issue. “Enough fighting for one day, if those boys in blue are stupid enough to stick around until the morning, we’ll just kick their behinds tomorrow. ”

Far better to settle down for the evening and avoid a potentially bloody mess of an attack over broken terrain up a hill in the dark with no idea of what Union forces may be in the area.

In hindsight– and certainly to wise observers like Trimble– this seems like an inexcusable offense. At the time, however, I can see Ewell making that judgment call.

– Finally, Ewell himself. Many observers agree that the effective division commander had given way to a much more cautious and reluctant corps commander. Reasons are myriad, but most fixate on Ewell’s injury at Second Manassas (losing a leg) and getting married soon before the Gettysburg campaign. Bottom line, he wasn’t the same aggressive commander that he was in the past. Combine that with the newfound stress of higher command, and I can understand his timidity– *especially* in the absence of clear orders from Lee (who can be faulted for leaving that much discretion to his corps commanders on the first day of Gettsyburg; let’s be honest, Hill and Ewell were not the trusted subordinates that Jackson was, and Lee should be blamed for not paying closer attention to them that day (Hill got them into the fight he probably should not have fought, and Ewell didn’t push hard enough when confronted with commanding terrain).

Anyway, Ewell was wrong not to take Culp’s Hill. But it was an honest mistake, and far more understandable than the mistakes of the 2nd day, and the utter catastrophe of the 3rd day.