Tempest At Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly, Part 5

Tempest at Ox Hill: The Battle of Chantilly
by David A. Welker

Chapter 5 – The Gathering Storm – Monday, September 1, 1862; Midnight to Noon
1. Just after midnight, Pope was informed of the shelling of his wagon train. This attack came on one of only two available retreat routes, but Pope, following a typical pattern by not fully trusting cavalry reports, decided that surely other sightings would have come in if Lee were flanking him. Pope did send a reconnaissance north towards the Little River Turnpike on a fairly wide front, and he also reinforced Jermantown at this time. It had stopped raining on the morning of September 1, but the day was cloudy and it looked like more rain was on the way. Dana’s Brigade (commanded by Edward Hinks) reached Jermantown, and Welker believes that Jermantown was finally able to be properly defended at this point. Just after dawn, Jackson began his own march down the Little River Turnpike. He reversed his marching order of the day before, allowing Starke to lead, and having Lawton and Hill follow. Jackson’s men were hungry, the wet road was a mess, Longstreet was nowhere near, and Jackson was worried about what he might run into, so the march was very slow. Jackson also ordered Stuart to scout ahead. A fight developed along Stringfellow Road between Starke’s Brigade and Howard’s Brigade around 11:20 A.M. Howard, following orders not to bring on a general engagement, retreated. Through some mix-up, Beverly Robertson’s Cavalry Brigade, thought to be scouting on Jackson’s right front, stayed with Starke. This resulted in no cavalry screen for Jackson in that important area. Pope knew now that he had to retreat. He sent yet another dispatch to Halleck asking what he should do.

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2. Pope ordered the II and V Corps (both AotP) to probe north towards the Little River Turnpike, and he sent Dana’s II Corps (AotP) brigade to reinforce Jermantown. Despite these precautions, Welker says that Pope still wanted to take the offensive. As dawn neared, Pope grew worried that these reconnaissance efforts would bring on a battle he didn’t want and wasn’t prepared for, so Sumner was instructed to retreat if faced with force. The patrols Pope sent north from Centreville towards the Little River Turnpike covered three roads from west to east: Braddock Road, Walney Road, and Stringfellow Road. Howard’s Brigade over on Stringfellow Road ran into Confederate infantry under Starke. Thus Pope found the information he had been looking for and knew what he should have known much earlier: Jackson was flanking him again.

3. During the morning and after his stragglers caught up, Jackson formed a marching order that I found to be very interesting. To do this formation justice, I’ll let Mr. Welker tell the story:

He directed his division commanders to deploy their brigades on each side of the road, positioning themselves in a two-man-deep line of battle facing either north or south rather than their original four-man-across column formation facing east. In the center of this formation Jackson posted the command’s artillery reserve, maximizing protection of his vulnerable, slow-moving guns and speeding their deployment for battle along a wide front.

This formation made his line three times as long on the march, meaning Jackson couldn’t command it as easily. Marching speed was slowed for readiness in the face of the enemy as well. Welker says Jackson was making absolutely sure he would be ready in the face of any attack.

4. Pope seemed to send an endless supply of messages to Halleck over these few days, seeking approval for whatever choice his indecisive mind had settled on that hour. In this particular instance, Pope was intent on retreating. This particular dispatch was intended to do three things, according to Welker:

    1. describe the army’s true condition and promise to attack soon
    2. lay the blame for the defeat at 2nd Bull Run on McClellan and his subordinates in the AotP
    3. ask for permission to retreat

Chapter 6 – Duel at Jermantown – Monday, September 1, 1862; 11:00 A.M. to 4:00 P.M.
1. Before his reconnaissance patrols could even report back, Pope received word from tow cavalrymen that they had seen Confederate infantry at Chantilly, which placed them in his rear, even farther east than his reconnaissance! Pope knew that if the Confederates reached Fairfax Courthouse (just east of Jermantown), his defenses at Centreville would be useless. Pope, still trying to save his career, did not want to retreat unless given an order from Halleck. Due to this, Pope played a dangerous game. He gambled that he could hold Lee at Jermantown while waiting for an order from Halleck to retreat. Welker points out that if Lee moved too fast or Halleck too slow, Pope could well have a disaster on his hands. Pope selected the III Corps of the Army of Virginia and the IX Corps to play his game. The III Corps would move to Jermantown to strengthen the forces there to the point of being able to hold off a potential attack by Lee, and the IX Corps would move to cover the Warrenton Turnpike east of Centreville in case the Confederates headed south to cut that route instead of attacking Jermantown. Pope actually visited Fitz-John Porter, commander of the Army of the Potomac’s V Corps and good friend of McClellan, for advice at this time. Welker says that Pope hoped to get the McClellanites to agree to a retreat. When this tactic didn’t work, Pope returned to his tent. Pope, reacting to the threat at Chantilly, ordered the III Corps to support Stevens in front of the force near Chantilly. However, Pope apparently never told Stevens of this support. In addition, Heintzelman apparently never told his division commanders where they were headed. Confusion reigned in high places, and this reflects poorly on Pope. Hooker, the temporary commander at Jermantown, received some reinforcements and decided to make his defense along Difficult Run, just west of the town. Jackson and Stuart probed this line and skirmishing broke out for a few hours. However, about this time, Jackson became aware of a threat to his right flank. It was Stevens, following orders to protect the Warrenton Turnpike from attack. Lee was near the battlefield that day, but he didn’t participate. Perhaps it had something to do with the fact that both hands were still in splints. Regardless, this was Jackson’s fight. To counter the threat from the Federals to his south, Jackson moved Branch’s and Field’s Brigades south of Little River Turnpike through some woods that fronted an open field on the east, and a corn field on the west.

2. Due to changing circumstances, Kearny’s Division of the III Corps (AotP) never reached Jermantown. However, other reinforcements did. Hooker’s own III Corps Division arrived. At 4 P.M. Sedgwick’s II Corps (AotP) Division and Couch’s Division of the IV Corps also reinforced Hooker. Pope had barely won his “dangerous game”, thanks in large part to Stevens, who single-handedly occupied Jackson for the remainder of the day.

3. Stevens got the IX Corps underway that day around 1 P.M. He was in temporary command of the unit because acting commander Jesse Reno had been sick for days. Although Reno was a solid leader, having the aggressive Stevens in command would prove fortuitous. I can’t see many other division commanders in the Union Army that day making the decision to attack Jackson with only their division and no supports in sight. Stevens, although he ultimately lost his life, was probably as well-suited to this assignment as anyone available. Pope was lucky to have had him.

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